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Essay
The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on
Reading Fuller
Peter Read Teachout*
Though he stands among the three or four great legal thinkers
our country has produced, [he] has seldom been described, and never
accurately, as the prophet of any particular "theory of law." ... His
insight was too rich and varied, his method too flexible and too finely
modulated to the task at hand, to make it possible for him to feel
comfortable under the banner of any philosophic faction.
If his work lacked the sloganized kind of unity that would bring
it under some familiar and inclusive rubric, this does not mean that it
was not permeated by a deeper kind of coherence. The thread of connection in his philosophy is found not in theories or doctrines, but in a
persistent
effort to solve certain basic and recurring problems of the
1
law.

In a world in which new "mighty Revolutions in Philosophy' 2 are announced almost daily, and "paradigm shifts"3 have
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.
1. Fuller, Reason and Fiatin Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REv. 376, 376 (1946)
(describing Cardozo in terms that arguably apply with equal force to himself)
[hereinafter cited as Fuller, Reason and Fiat].
2. The phrase "mighty Revolutions in Philosophy" comes from the reference to "all those mighty Revolutions, that have happened in Empire, in Philosophy, and in Religion" in J. SwiFT, A TALE OF A TUB 171 (A. Guthkelch &
D. Smith 2d ed. 1958). The first such "mighty Revolution" was the law-andeconomics revolution spearheaded by then Professor, now Judge, Richard Posner of the University of Chicago Law School, see R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE (1981); Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a PropertyInterest
14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971); the second was the antiliberal, or radical communitarian, revolution given impetus by the writings of Professors Roberto Unger
and Morton Horwitz of Harvard Law School, see M. HoRwrrz,THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLITICS (1975); R. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976); the third, an

outgrowth of the second, and in some ways both the most zany and the most
typical, was the "mighty Revolution" represented by the antiestablishment
Conference of Critical Legal Studies, see CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Critical Legal Studies Symposium]. There was also the radical feminist revolution, which shares the radical
pose of the previous two but seems to have independent intentions, see Griffin,
The Way of All Ideolog,

in FEMINIST THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 273
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become as fashionable as shoulder knots and silver lace, 4 Lon
Fuller's jurisprudential writings stand out as islands of sanity
and light. His essays, almost without exception, are classics.
They are performances of thoughtfulness that transcend the
rise and fall of passing jurisprudential fashions. Collectively,
moreover, they give expression to an ethical vision of great and
compelling integrity. It is hardly remarkable that Fuller has
come to be regarded as one of the most influential jurisprudential writers of our time. 5 Indeed, it would not be an exaggera(N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo & B. Gelpi eds. 1982); Hartsock, Feminist Theory
and the Development of Revolutionary Strategy, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY
AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 56 (Z. Eisenstein ed. 1979); MacKinnon, Feminis7, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7
SIGNS 515 (1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,8 SIGNS 685 (1983); Polan, Toward A Theory of
Law and Patriarchy,in THE POLITICs OF LAw 294 (D. Kairys ecL 1982). With
the possible exception of the law-and-economics revolution, these revolutions
have generally been utopian in thrust. For example, Elaine Hoffman Baruch
characterized the feminist movement as utopian:
Its emphasis on new modes of living with regard to the individual, the
family, and the state, and its attempt to change "human nature" as
men traditionally have defined it, entitle feminism to a place among
the grand visionary schemes.... [Flor most women, utopia is statelessness and the overcoming of hierarchy ....
WOMEN IN SEARCH OF UTOPIA: MAVERICKS AND MTHMAxas xii (R. Rohrlich
& E. Baruch eds. 1984). The most recent "mighty Revolution" was the one announced by Professor Bruce Ackerman, celebrating the radical transformation
of traditional legal man into an "enlightened" homo economicus-essentially
bringing us full circle. See B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW
65-71, 93-104 (1984).
3. The term "paradigm shift" was coined by Thomas Kuhn to indicate
the fundamental realignment of a culture around a new paradigm. T. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66, 150 (2d ed. 1970). It is fashionable among legal scholars today to see a major cultural shift in the winds.
See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 60 (legal culture shifting from a traditional common-law toward scientific-economic paradigm); Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982)
(culture shifting from a liberal toward a radical communitarian paradigm);
Griffin, supra note 2, at 289 (culture shifting from a traditional liberal male, or
patriarchal, paradigm toward a vaguely perceived feminist alternative).
4. The phrase "shoulder knots and silver lace" is an oblique reference to
the way in which the three brothers in Swift's Tale of a Tub succumbed to
passing fashions in dress-to the new fads of "Shoulder-Knots," "Gold Lace,"
"flame Coloured Sattin," and "Silver Fringe"-in contravention of the plain
directive in their father's will not to embellish in such a way upon the simple
coats they inherited. J. SwIFT, supra note 2, at 82-88.
5. Robert Summers's assessment is fairly representative:
[Fuller] is unquestionably the leading secular natural lawyer of the
twentieth century in the English-speaking world. His work on legal
processes and on the principles of legality qualify him as the greatest
proceduralist in the history of legal theory. He was also one of the
foremost theorists of means-end relations in legal ordering.
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tion to say that he probably has had a greater impact on the
shape and direction of contemporary legal thought than any
other single modern writer.
It is puzzling then that, for all the apparent influence
Fuller's jurisprudence has had on contemporary legal thought,
his essays themselves, as essays, remain on the whole so little
appreciated and understood. They are so rarely taken seriously
on their own terms. We still go to them expecting them to offer up some great internally coherent theoretical system, and
still continue to come away disappointed when they do not. In
our frustration then, we push and shove and manipulate in an
effort to extract from the essays the comprehensive statement
of a theory of law they themselves seem so reluctant to yield.
And inevitably, whatever emerges is somehow not Fuller.
The problem seems to be that all along we have been reading Fuller's essays in the wrong way. We have tended to regard
Fuller primarily as a theorist. We have approached him as a
great constructor of theoretical systems and have viewed his essays as forming building blocks within those systems. But it
may be that if we want to understand his jurisprudence, we
have to think of Fuller less as a theorist than as an ethical
writer. We must learn to regard his essays not as works of theory but as ethical compositions-as writings designed to instruct not only at the level of surface argument but also by
their own performance. Until we are prepared to view Fuller
in this more complex light, we will be barred from entering the
rich and difficult world to which his essays give such complete
expression. Theory, to be sure, was one resource Fuller called
upon in his jurisprudence, but it was only one, and until this is
appreciated his jurisprudential endeavor and achievement can
never be fully understood.
I. INTRODUCTION: FULLER'S SEARCH FOR "A
DEEPER KIND OF COHERENCE"
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Fuller was deeply interested in the forms and traditions of continental legal and
philosophical thought.6 He did not receive the continental
learning passively, however, but brought to it an invigorating
R. SUMmERs, LON L. FULLER 151 (1984).
6. See, for example, Fuller's puzzlement over why "the American legal

realist has displayed so little interest in European legal speculation" and his
expression of the importance of paying attention to continental theory. Fuller,
American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV.429, 438 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
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practicality and worldliness that at once transformed the inherited categories of thought and, in doing so, breathed into them a
new life. It was in many respects a classic encounter: on the
one hand, the young American legal scholar with his pragmatic
and down-to-earth sensibility-his concern for the workability
of things-and his keen sense of justice and fair play; and, on
the other hand, the disciplined intellectual forms of continental
learning. And out of this encounter emerged in time a highly
original approach to the traditional problems of jurisprudence,
an approach that has fundamentally altered our understanding
of the nature of the jurisprudential enterprise.
Everywhere Fuller went, it seems, new jurisprudential
movements or schools developed. It is Fuller's jurisprudence,
for example, that provides the intellectual and ethical foundations for what has subsequently emerged as a distinct "legal
process" school of American jurisprudence. One can see the
clear imprint of his thought in Hart and Sacks's classic materials on The Legal Process,7 and derivatively in the writings of
other scholars who follow within that tradition.8 Fuller's jurisprudence is also an important source of inspiration for those
who view themselves as carrying on the secular natural law tradition of legal philosophy. One thinks, for example, of Fuller's
shaping influence upon the work of Ronald Dworkin, 9 perhaps
the leading contemporary scholar within the rights tradition.
Nor has the sphere of Fuller's influence been confined to
the boundaries of this country. He has had a significant impact,
to cite just a couple of examples, on the thought and writing of
Patrick Atiyah, 10 the English contracts scholar and perhaps the
leading contracts scholar in the world today, and even on that
of H.L.A. Hart, 1 ' the great English positivist with whom Fuller
Fuller, Legal Realism]. Fuller did not take a romantic view of "pristine pragmatism." See id.at 438 n.23.
7. Fuller's purposive theory of law receives perhaps its most complete
expression in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958).
8. Included within this group would have to be the late Alexander
Bickel of Yale Law School and John Hart Ely now Dean of the Stanford Law
School.
9. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 14. Although both the Ely ("legal
process") and the Dworkin ("natural rights") schools can be seen as descendants of Fuller's jurisprudence, important differences separate them. Compare,
for example, Ely, Democracy and the Right to be Differen, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
397, 405 (1981) with Dworkin, A Reply by Ronald Dworkin, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 247 passim (M. Cohen ed. 1984).
10. R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 14; see P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1 n.1 (1979).
11. Fuller's impact here was admittedly of a different sort, since it pri-
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engaged in famous debates over the relationship of morality
and law.
But that is not all. Much of the current scholarly interest
in alternative dispute resolution and in polycentric decisionmaking can be directly traced to Fuller's creative pioneering
work in these areas.12 And this is to say nothing of his more
specific but equally significant contributions to our understanding of contracts law13 and to the reform of legal education. 14
No matter where one finally comes out with respect to the
ideological vision expressed in Fuller's writings, one cannot fail
to be impressed by the tremendous fertility of the man's imagination-by his genius for proceeding to the heart of what he
would call "the permanent problems" of the law' 5 and for
opening those problems up in a way that released them for productive future inquiry.
If Fuller's jurisprudential career was characterized in part
by great innovation, it was also marked by a pattern of resistance to what might be called extreme allegiances. Thus it is
not at all uncharacteristic of Fuller that he should have been at
once a leading force in the revolt against the radical conceptualism of Williston and others,' 6 and at the same time one of the
first to criticize the extravagances of the legal realists. 17 Fuller
squarely rejected the formalist claim that law was a completely
rational science,' 8 and pressed insistently for recognition of the
marily took the form of helping Hart pull into sharper focus his own positivist
views which were in some respects directly opposed to Fuller's. But it was an
important impact nonetheless.
12. See R. SuMMERs, supra note 5, at 98-100, 107; Fuller, Forms and Lim-

its of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978); Fuller, MediationIts Forms and Functions,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
13. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 123-36.
14. See id at 137-50.
15. Fuller, Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 453.
16. See Fuller, Williston on Contracts,18 N.C.L. REV. 1, 9-15 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Fuller, Williston].
17. See Fuller, Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 432-62.
18. Fuller notes:
The traditional theory supposed, or pretended to suppose, that the
judge was influenced solely by a segment of his intellectual environment, that represented by "law" and legal theory. This view is no
longer tenable. We now realize that rules are impotent to exercise
any real control over the judicial process. Even when they seem to

chart a definite course (which is seldom because of their vagueness)
frequent judicial aberrations from the charted course remind us that
there must be other, more significant factors in the judge's
environment.
Id at 453; see also id. at 447 (describing legal science as "a science which has
suffered for centuries from an unbridled pseudo-rationalism"); Fuller, Willis-
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inescapability of discretion and fiat in judicial decision' 9-but
he also believed passionately in the importance of reason in the
law. He was convinced, as he once wrote, that "we shall find
that reason has capacities we had not suspected in it."2 The
same general pattern appears in the relationship he developed
to the natural rights and positivist schools of legal philosophy.
Fuller resisted the embrace of traditional natural law jurisprudence, in part because of its dependence on belief in the existence of a fixed set of universal principles, 21 and in part out of
an acute awareness of the abuses to which such jurisprudence
historically had been put.22 But he rejected even more vehemently legal positivism, viewing it as a soulless and corrosive
philosophy. 23 His own philosophical journey was marked by a
pattern of constant correction and recorrection of ethical
course-by a continuing effort to discover and articulate "affirmations of the middle range."
The most striking feature of Fuller's jurisprudence is the
powerful transformation it works in our understanding of the
nature of the troublesome antinomies with which legal philosophy has traditionally been concerned. Fuller's thought is a
great master solvent of the classic antinomies of jurisprudence:
law versus morality, reason versus fiat, formalism versus realism, logic versus policy, justice versus efficiency, substance versus procedure, means versus ends-all of these traditional
oppositions are somehow mysteriously dissolved and just as
mysteriously recombined in the liberating alchemy of his juriston, supra note 16, at 3-5 (criticizing Williston for rejecting as "freaks" those
cases that do not fit into his formal system); id. at 9 (criticizing Williston for
giving up "at the very outset" any attempt "to shape the law by direct reference to social interests").
19. See Fuller, Reason and Fia supra note 1, at 377-89.
20. Letter from Lon Fuller to Thomas Reed Powell (undated), reprinted
in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER

293, 303 (K. Winston ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Fuller Letter].
21. See Fuller, Reason and Fia supra note 1, at 385-86.
22. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 700-01 (temp. ed. 1949)
[hereinafter cited as L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE].

23. See L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 112-15 (Praeger ed. reprint
1968); L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 128-40 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as L. FULLER, QUEST]; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106-18 (rev. ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as L. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW]; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart; 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631-61 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Fuller, Reply to ProfessorHart].
24. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 47, 47-48 (K. Winston ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as L. FULLER, Means and Ends]. For a description of what Fuller intended by "affirmations of the middle range," see infra note 134.
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prudence. This is not, of course, an accidental effect in Fuller's
case, but a reflection-indeed, a deliberate consequence-of
what he took to be his central jurisprudential task: to free us
from the phony oppositions that shackle inherited language and
thought.2
At the heart of Fuller's endeavor is the attempt to forge
out of the inherited materials of our legal culture an ethically
integrated approach to language and experience. One can see
this integrative impulse at work, for example, in Fuller's insistence that the "is" and "ought" of legal rules should be regarded, not as belonging to separate universes of discourse, but
rather as aspects of "an integral reality."26 It is reflected as
well in his rejection of a mode of philosophical discourse that
permitted "ends" to be considered in isolation from "means,"
and in his self-conscious effort to carve out a new critical vocabulary that would force recognition of the interconnectedness of
the two-to forge a language that would more fully express the
complex relationship of interdependency that exists between,
on the one hand, the substantive vision we hold of the ends of
the social order and, on the other, the procedures we develop
and make available for the realization of those ends.2 These
are but two strands, moreover, of what eventually emerges in
Fuller's writings as a deeply integrated ethical vision.
Fuller's effort in this respect is much like Plato's in the
Gorgias.28 The central and recurring thrust of his jurisprudence is to move us from a position in which we regard experience in terms of false or simplistic antitheses toward a
perspective that allows us to see the underlying relationships in
a more complex and integrated light. It is to lead us to view
the contrary tendencies and impulses of experience as part of a
force us to take, as he would say,
larger "integral reality"--to
29
"the whole view."
In pursuit of the establishment of such an integrated ethic,
Fuller was prepared to push beyond the bounds of traditional
25. An early example is Fuller's rejection of the opposition between logic
and policy upon which Williston's conceptualism is based. Fuller, Williston,
supra note 16, at 8-10. Fuller takes much the same approach, as we shall see,
toward the other oppositions that constitute the classic antinomies of jurisprudence. See infra notes 119-185 and accompanying text.
26. L. FULLER, QUEST, supra note 23, at 11.
27. See L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 54-64.
28. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
29. Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 391-92; see infra notes 90-103
and accompanying text and text following note 103.
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theory-indeed, beyond those of theory itself. He was not a
theory-dependent scholar, and certainly not the sort to spend
his energies seeking to discover an ultimate theoretical fix for
the problems of human existence. Fuller's intelligence operated in different, more complex realms. His essays reflect a
keen awareness of the limitations of the language of theory,30
and a conscious effort to break through those limitations in order to give expression to what he calls "a deeper kind of
coherence." 3 1
One can see this reflected, among other places, in the curiously amphibious character of the critical mode we encounter
in Fuller's essays: it is neither fish nor fowl, neither theory nor
empiricism, but a mode of criticism that combines, in an almost
perfect fusion, the spirit of contemplative inquiry we expect of
a philosopher with a writer's deep fascination for the concrete.
Fuller's jurisprudence forms, as it were, a constant motion between the general and the conceptual on the one hand, and the
"hard and earthy reality"3 2 of ordinary experience on the other.
Fuller was in this sense, it might be said, almost a poet.
This is not, however, to suggest that Fuller's writing is
without ideological implication. Indeed, the particular fascination of Fuller's jurisprudence today lies in the fact that it forms
a distinctly liberal jurisprudence at a time when the word "liberal" seems to have passed, at least temporarily, from academic
favor.33 Fuller's jurisprudence is liberal in a double sense: not
only does it give expression to a liberal ideological vision, and
do so with great integrity, it also reflects in its deepest fabric
what might be called a liberal temper. One encounters in
Fuller's essays a kind of humility, decency, and openness to correction-a respect for the complexity of the enterprise-that
sometimes seems lacking in the more recent, morally-assured,
30. See infra note 67.
31. Fuller invokes this phrase in describing Cardozo's jurisprudential approach. See Fuller, Reason and Fia supra note 1, at 376.

32. Id. at 379.
33. The rejection of the traditional liberal view by contemporary legal

scholars, particularly by those associated with the Conference of Critical Legal
Studies, is discussed in Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics,and the Critical
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought 36 STAN.

L. REV. 199 (1984) and in Nash, In re Radical Interpretationsof American
Law: The Relation of Law and History, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 274 (1983). For representative attacks on the "liberal" tradition, see R. UNGEit, KNOWLEDGE &
POLnCs (1975); CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, supra note 2 passim; Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movemen 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983).
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"grand theory" legal scholarship to which we have become accustomed. To many of the current generation of legal scholars,
Fuller undoubtedly would appear as something of an old fuddydud, as the quintessential representative of the failed vision
of "liberal legalism, '3 5 and his legal scholarship, as the embodiment of a "decadent, bourgeois" perspective on law and the social order that no longer has anything to offer us. And to be
fair, one does occasionally come across a slight scent of mustiness in his jurisprudence-the sense that here is a scholar wrestling with problems and issues that no longer centrally occupy
us, nor ought they to.
Yet to read Fuller's essays themselves-to read them
slowly and carefully and in their entirety-gives rise to an altogether different impression. What strikes one most is the exact
opposite of what one might expect: it is the curious freshness
and vitality of these essays, the sense that they are somehow
deeply pertinent to the issues and problems with which we are
today struggling to come to terms. But what is it about Fuller's
essays that accounts for their continued vitality? What is it
that holds them together? What sort of education-ethical edu34. The works cited supra note 2 are representative of the grand theory
approach to legal scholarship.
35. See, e.g., Roberto Unger's discussion of the "disastrous implications of
the purposive theory of adjudication," in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLmcs
94-97 (1975). 'iberal
legalism" is discussed in Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practicein the Age of American Enterprise,1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AmEiCA 70, 88-101, 106-10 (G. Geison ed.
1983); Kare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 276 & n.36
(1978); Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in
Deconstruction,36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1984). As Gordon makes clear, "liberal legalism" is a construct that bears more relation to the extreme market
variant of liberal thought one encounters in European political theory than to
the liberal tradition as it has actually developed in the Anglo-American context. The Anglo-American liberal tradition is reflected in works such as L.
TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION (Viking Press ed. 1950). It is the latter
tradition to which Fuller belongs.
It is noteworthy that Professor Bruce Ackerman, who views himself as
carrying forward the liberal torch, dismisses the contributions of the "Harvard
group" (of which Fuller was a member) as "simplistic" and obsolete:
Instead of building realistic, let alone rigorous, models of bureaucratic
and legislative behavior, they were content with simplistic conceptions of these institutions....
An even more serious flaw becomes clear when we turn from
legal process to legal substance. Here, the Harvard group simply had
nothing to offer, other than a vague recognition that new forms of expertise were aborning somewhere in bureaucracy-land.
B. AcERMA, supra note 2, at 39-40. But see id. at 33 n.5 (Ackerman acknowledging his debt to Fuller).
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cation-do these essays, some of which were written more than
a half-century ago, hold for us?
This Essay is an effort, however preliminary and tentative,
to formulate answers to these questions. I begin by asking why
it is that those who seek from Fuller's jurisprudence some
statement of systematic theory come away so consistently frustrated. What is it about Fuller's jurisprudence that seems to resist the "theory seeking" approach? I go on to suggest it is
possible to develop an alternative critical approach that will
provide better access to Fuller's jurisprudence. Essentially, the
position I take is this: If we want to come to terms with
Fuller's jurisprudence, we must give up reading it as if it were a
form of systematic theory stamped in the mold of the nineteenth century, and learn to read it instead as we do the works
of the great eighteenth century English ethical writers such as
Swift, Johnson, Austen, and Burke. Once our critical perspective has been realigned in this way, everything else falls into
place. What was once confusing and unclear now begins to
make sense; what once seemed the reflection of an internally
contradictory view of the world now takes on a remarkable
unity.
The remainder of the Essay is devoted to an application of
this alternative critical approach to Fuller's jurisprudence. I
begin by setting forth in large terms Fuller's basic jurisprudential vision. Next I discuss the relationship between that large
vision and what might be described as the organizing principle
of his jurisprudence-"the principle of polarity." I then attempt to show how the principle of polarity serves as a crucial
"compositional ethic" in Fuller's essays, shaping not only the
structure of those essays but also their underlying meaning. Finally, I survey from a somewhat broader perspective the underlying unity of Fuller's jurisprudence. I conclude by offering
some observations on how we ought to understand the nature
of Fuller's jurisprudential achievement.
II. FULLER'S JURISPRUDENCE AS A SOURCE OF
FRUSTRATION FOR THE THEORY-SEEKING
READER: THE PROBLEM OF FALSE
EXPECTATIONS
It is a common and recurring criticism among contemporary readers of Fuller that his jurisprudence lacks theoretical
discipline. This complaint surfaces, for example, in Professor
Kenneth Winston's criticism of Fuller's "almost casual manner
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of argument," 36 an observation which leads Winston to conclude that Fuller's insights into the relationship of law and morality, however potentially valid and important, need "to be
restated in a more rigorous form." 37 Much the same sentiment
is reflected in Professor Robert Summers's recent study of
Fuller's work. 3s Summers finds "exasperating"3 9 Fuller's failure to provide anywhere a comprehensive statement of his theory of law-his failure to sit down to pull it all together into a
single coherent theoretical package. This is such a "serious
deficienc[y]"' 4 0 in Summers's view, indeed, that it comes to form
a central and dominating preoccupation of his treatment of
Fuller. These statements are not just isolated criticisms, moreover, but reflections of a frustration experienced more generally by contemporary readers of Fuller who, like Winston and
Summers, seek from Fuller's jurisprudence the statement of
some form of internally-coherent theory.
Whether this perceived failure on Fuller's part is in fact a
failure, or is instead a conscious and integral aspect of his jurisprudence and a source of its unique vitality, is a question to
which we will return later. For the moment, I want to focus on
the kinds of difficulties that arise when one brings to Fuller's
jurisprudence the expectation that it will in one form or another yield a statement of systematic theory-when, in short,
one tries to force Fuller's jurisprudence into a theoretical mold.
A good illustration of the problems that can arise is provided by Professor Summers's recent book on Fuller.41 Summers's book is significant in part because it represents the only
comprehensive study of Fuller's thought that has been attempted to date, and thus might be taken by some as the definitive work on Fuller.42 For us, however, the primary
significance of Summers's books lies in the fact that it is representative of what might be called the theory-seeking approach
36. Winston, Introduction to L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED EssAYs OF LON L. FULLER 44 (K. Winston ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Winston, Introduction].
37. Id
38. R. SUMMERs, supra note 5.
39. Id.at 107.
40. I&; see also id. at 108-09 (Summers's complaint about Fuller's failure
to develop "a general theory of 'process values' "); id. at 120 (Summers's
criticism of Fuller's failure to "work out a comprehensive theory of
interpretation").
41. R. SUMMERs, supra note 5.
42. The only other extended discussion of Fuller's thought that is widely
available is Winston, Introduction, supra note 36, at 11-44.

1084

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1073

to Fuller's jurisprudence, and in this capacity offers a perfect illustration of what can go wrong when one tries to force Fuller's
jurisprudence into the mold of systematic theory. Summers's
study provides, in this sense, a textbook example of how not to
43
read Fuller.
Summers's approach is deeply colored by his view that
Fuller's jurisprudence is a "problem" because of Fuller's failure
to say what he had to say in a more disciplined theoretical way.
As Summers sees it, then, the primary task for the expositor of
Fuller's jurisprudence is to attempt to reconstruct Fuller's
thought in the language of systematic theory. And that is what
Summers sets out to do. His basic effort is to fill in or complete
(or at least to suggest the direction that such completion might
take) the theoretical system that Fuller left "unfinished."
From the very outset, however, Summers begins to run into difficulties. The difficulties he encounters, moreover, are different in degree only, and not in kind, from those encountered by
others in the course of similar efforts to reconstruct Fuller's jurisprudence in theoretical terms.4
These difficulties or
problems break down into four basic types: the problem of substitute terminology, the problem of false categories, the problem of theoretical paraphrase, and the reconstruction fallacy.
Each of these problems can be illustrated by calling upon specific examples from Summers's work.
A. THE PROBLEM OF SUBSTITUTE TERMINOLOGY
The first type of problem involves the distortions that flow
from attempts to superimpose upon Fuller's jurisprudence an
alien terminology imported from some external theoretical perspective. 45 In Summers's work, this problem is manifested by
43. For the view that Summers's book on Fuller does not live up to the
high standards of the Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory series of which it represents the fourth volume, see Lebel, Blame This Messenger: Summers on
Fuller,83 MICH.L. REV. 717, 724 (1985). Although I do not agree with Lebel in
every particular, I share his assessment of Summers's contribution in this
respect.
44. See, e.g., T. BENDITr, LAw As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 95-99 (1978); R.
SARTORiUs, INDrVIuAL CONDUCT AND SociAL NORms 163-73 (1975). As Professor Winston has observed of these two efforts in particular: "Even philosophers who express sympathy with Fuller's general orientation attempt to
reconstruct his account in ways that undo the original idea." Winston, The
Ideal Element in a Definition of Law, PHIL. & L. NEWSLEITER AM. PHIL. A.,
Summer 1985, at 3, 3.

45. The problem is akin to that described by Fuller in his review of
Ogden's book Bentham's Theory of Fictions: "[fln several instances... Ben-
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Summers's tendency to put words into Fuller's mouth that are
not Fuller's own and, in doing so, to ascribe to Fuller positions
that in fact he never held. An example is Summers's assertion
that Fuller "held that legal rules were complexes of 'is-ought'
and in this way value-laden."' ' The problem is that this is not
what Fuller "held" at all, but rather one of Summers's reconstructions. 47 In fact, Fuller rejects this "value-laden" form of
description in favor of a critical vocabulary centered in the normative term "ought." 48 More is involved here than a simple
failure to convey accurately the way in which Fuller himself
thought and talked about the world. As it turns out, Fuller rejects the "value-laden" way of thinking and talking about experience 49 for reasons that are intimately tied to his deepest
jurisprudential views. Fuller goes to great lengths to show how
"value" talk of this sort carries with it disintegrative tendencies
that he thought it extremely important to avoid.50 Summers's
tham is made, somewhat anachronistically, to speak (in paraphrase, to be sure)
[This
the technical language developed by the editor in his own work ....
reworking of Bentham's thought into new nomenclature involves a genuine
risk of perverting it." Fuller, Book Review, 47 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1933).
The difference is that here the risk of perversion arises not just from translation of Fuller's thought into another writer's particularterminology, although
that risk is present too, but from translation into the language of theory itself.
46. R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 34.
47. See, e.g., iai at 34 n.* (asterisk-marked footnote) ("Fuller did not often
use the word value, preferring the word ought instead."). Summers then proceeds regularly to use his own term "value-laden" instead of Fuller's "ought."
See, e.g., id at 35, 41.
For other instances of Summers's "reconstruction" activity, see id at 26
(Summers offers his own reconstruction of Fuller's views); id at 54 ("What
follows is again my own systematization of Fuller's views. He did not himself
draw his thoughts together precisely in this way."); idi at 72 ("Overall, Fuller's
scattered remarks on the general obligation to obey the law align him more
with the spirit of classical natural law."); id. at 101 ("The virtues and potential
of Fuller's general theory of the main processes of socio-legal ordering are, in
my view, numerous and beyond doubt. He never drew these together and
summarized them, and that must now be done."); id. at 107 (after complaining
that Fuller did not develop a comprehensive "general theory of legal process,"
Summers takes it upon himself to suggest how "one could formulate a comprehensive general theory in just these terms").
48. Id at 34 n.* (asterisk-marked footnote).
49. See L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 57-58.
50. In his essay Means and Ends Fuller suggests that "value" talk of this
sort leads to a technocratic and mistaken view of the task of social design. It is
disintegrative in tendency because it leads to divorce of consideration of
"means" (which would become a task for economic specialists) from consideration of "ends" or "end states" (which would remain a task for philosophers,
theologians, statesmen, and public opinion). Fuller rejects this way of talking
about experience because it implies an ethically disintegrated world of "endsetters" on the one hand and "means-specialists" on the other. Id. at 57-64.
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substitution of his own "value-laden" terminology for Fuller's
language of "ought" results, in other words, in a serious perversion of Fuller's thought. What is involved is not simply harmless error, but significant distortion-more than that, it is a
form of betrayal. 51
B.

THE PROBLEM OF FALSE CATEGORIES

The second major problem has to do with the distortions
that result from attempts to force Fuller's thought into the conventional categories of jurisprudential theory. Summers, for
example, relies heavily upon the traditional categories of theory in attempting to explain Fuller's jurisprudence.5

2

He does

That is why Fuller preferred an ethical language that proceeded on what he
terms an "attitudeof expectancy," on the "sentimentof 'ought."' Fuller, Legal
Realism, supra note 6, at 458 (emphasis added).
51. Summers's substitution of his own terminology for Fuller's leads to
other types of mischief. In this instance, for example, Summers's "valueladen" analysis leads him to launch upon discussion of the question of whether
believing that law is value-laden necessarily means believing that the values
with which a particular law is "laden" are good or moral ones. R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, at 34. Summers's answer, for what it is worth, is no. Id. This
leads to yet further discussion of what Summers advances as a critically significant distinction between "value-laden" and "moral." Id at 34-41.
The problem with this is that the underlying question is not one with
which Fuller himself was, or was likely to be, terribly concerned. There is
nothing about either the issue itself or the terms in which it is analyzed that
bears Fuller's particular jurisprudential stamp. Indeed, if one approaches the
question from the perspective of Fuller's normative "ought" rather than that
of Summers's substitute term "value-laden," it arguably becomes something of
a nonproblem. It does so because, read fairly in context, Fuller's "sentiment of
ought," see supra note 50, is clearly a morally-infused notion and not a morally-neutral one. The same sort of moral vision informs Fuller's view of
"ought" as informs his view that in interpreting legislation the judge should
attribute, subject to explicit rebuttal, a just and reasonable purpose to the legislature. It is reflected as well in the fact that Fuller does not address us in his
jurisprudence as scientifically-detached intellects but rather as whole persons
and moral beings. Consider, for example, the ethical character of the audience
implied by the following statement: "nearly all of us want a just social order,
with an elimination of discriminations and privileges." L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 699. Fuller's use of "ought" has to be seen in the context of a larger effort on Fuller's part to establish the conditions for the
maintenance and development not simply of a legal system but of a moral
legal system-or, as he would put it, a "good social order." See infra notes 149150 and accompanying text. To Fuller, as one critic has observed, the "law itself embodies moral aspirations and defines moral relationships." Winston, Introduction, supra note 36, at 31. Summers's distracting excursion in this
instance is representative of the kinds of problems that arise from failing to
read Fuller on his own terms.
52. Summers's effort to "locate" Fuller proceeds from the following introductory statement: "In the past hundred years, encyclopedists have often clas-
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so, moreover, in the face of Fuller's explicit rejection of those
very categories as unhelpful and misleading.53 Perhaps the best
example of this is Summers's repeated insistence that, notwithstanding Fuller's own clear reluctance to being so located,5
Fuller really belongs in the natural law as opposed to the positivist camp.55 In a similar vein, Summers later attempts to
characterize Fuller as a procedural rather than substantive
legal philosopher, as a scholar so preoccupied with questions
about the procedures we employ that he failed to pay adequately focused attention to the question of what the substansified legal theorists into one (or more) of four categories: natural law
theorists, legal positivists, historical jurists, and thinkers of the sociological or
instrumentalist schools." R. SUMMERs, supra note 5, at 62. It is unclear why
Summers should insist in relying upon these traditional categories of the "encyclopedists" in attempting to locate Fuller instead of drawing upon the quite
different categories that Fuller himself developed. It is another instance of refusing to read Fuller on his own terms.
53. See Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 377, 391.
54. Fuller explains very clearly his reasons for grounding his jurisprudence in "the principle of the common need" rather than in "'natural justice,'" "'natural law,"' and "'the law of nature"' in L. FULLER,
JURIsPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 700-01. First, unlike the natural law approach, the principle of common need does not arrive at "any inclusive
formula for stating just how social restraint and individual freedom shall be
balanced against one another." Striking a Burkean posture, Fuller argues this
is something that must be settled differently under different circumstances.
Id at 700. Second, Fuller distrusts the simplistic opposition between "rationalism" and "intuition" that underlies much natural law philosophy. Id at 70001. Third, he wants to avoid the "emotional connotations," either radical or
conservative, that often attach to the natural law position. I Finally, Fuller
rejects the view implicit in natural law philosophy that there is one "unchanging, external standard" which is the "same for all men at all times." No such
implication is conveyed by the principle of common need. What that need is
"depends not only on the environment in which men live, and on their physical and mental endowments, but also on their moral and intellectual attain.ments." I& at 701; see also Fuller, Reason and Fiat supra note 1, at 379-80
(courts, and therefore natural law theorists, must consider "prevailing conceptions of morality").
Fuller rejects the natural rights position clearly and unambiguously, in
other words, and does so for much the same reasons that Burke does in his
Reflections on the Revolution in France. E. BURKE, REECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 70-72 (T.Mahoney, Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1955).

It is unclear why Summers wants to ignore this Burkean aspect of Fuller's jurisprudence, especially in view of the fact that Fuller was clearly influenced by
Burke's thought. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 223-226.
55. The following assertions by Summers are typical: "In regard to this
core element, then, Fuller must be classedas in the naturallaw tradition," R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 65 (emphasis added); "[i]n these terms, Fuller again
qualiftes as a natural law theorist" id. at 68 (emphasis added); "[o]verall,
Fuller's scattered remarks on the general obligation to obey the law align him
more with the spirit of classical naturallaw," id. at 72 (emphasis added).
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tive ends of the social order ought to be.56

What is wrong with these characterizations is not that,
viewed from a certain perspective, they do not have a limited
validity. What is wrong--and the full significance of this can be
made clear only later-is that they implicitly adopt a perspective that it was the central aim of Fuller's jurisprudence to reject. 57

Summers's

characterizations

are

based

upon

an

antithetical organization of language and experience that Fuller
clearly and explicitly rejects as false and misleading. When
Summers suggests that Fuller adopts a natural law as opposed
to a positivist approach to legal experience, or characterizes
Fuller's jurisprudence as reflecting a procedural rather than a
substantive view of the problems of the social order, he is exhibiting the very habits of mind that Fuller condemns in his jurisprudence as misleading and disintegrative. In Fuller's view,
these are classic instances of the phony oppositions in inherited
legal thought that have gotten us into so much trouble. To conceive the underlying relationships in terms of simplistic opposition-as fully expressible in phrases like "as opposed to" or
"rather than"-is to present a false antithesis, a false alternative, a false choice. Indeed, the central and fundamental thrust
of Fuller's jurisprudence is to disabuse us of the habit of thinking and talking about legal experience in this way.
C.

THE PROBLEM OF THEORETICAL PARAPHRASE

Perhaps the most serious and pervasive problem, however,
is the "platitudinization" of Fuller's thought that occurs whenever it is paraphrased in the language of abstract theory. There
is a sort of Cinderella-in-reverse syndrome here in which the
golden coach is turned into a pumpkin. When we encounter
Fuller's thought in his essays themselves, our impression is that
of being in the presence of a creative mind actively at work--of
an ethical imagination in active and vital performance. When
56. Summers states: "To [Fuller], it was just as important, if not more important, to study the nature, provinces, and limits of the processes that order

society (and their corresponding forms of law and other outcomes) as to study
ultimate ends such as freedom, justice, security, and equality." Id at 76.
While Summers seems to recognize conceptually the importance Fuller attaches to viewing ends and means in an integrated light, ii, he continues to
talk about Fuller's jurisprudence as if the two were separable. The contrast he
adopts in the passage quoted above between "processes" and "ultimate ends,"
and the suggestion that Fuller attached "more" importance to the former than
to the latter reflects this tendency.
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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that same "thought" is translated into the language of theory,
however, it is inevitably transformed into a kind of lifeless
platitude.
Consider, for example, Summers's attempt to summarize
Fuller's critically important views on the relationship of law
and morality: "In sum, then, genuine legal processes are valueladen. Moreover, certain values must necessarily be served if
certain processes are to exist or to function genuinely as such
processes. Further, since certain of these values are values of
moral worth, morals are necessarily a part of such legal
processes."' 8 Whatever else might be said about the world one
encounters in this passage, the one thing that is certain is that
it is not Fuller's world. The first sentence proceeds upon Summers's own "value-laden" terminology, invoking a language and
opening upon a mode of analysis that Fuller himself did not
embrace.5 9 The final sentence addresses a problem that Fuller
did not address, nor is it one which he would necessarily have
considered terribly significant. 60 That leaves the second sentence which is so vague and abstract that it is difficult to say
whether, in some remote sense, it is consistent with Fuller's jurisprudence or not. In any case, it is clearly not faithful to
Fuller's jurisprudence. The "thought" we encounter in this
passage is as lifeless and flat as a stale beer.
What we see reflected here, moreover, is typical of our experience generally in Summers's book. We wander though the
dust and powder of Summers's paraphrase wondering increasingly what it was about Fuller's jurisprudence that caused such
a stir in the first place. Nor is this platitudinization of Fuller's
thought unique to Summers's work. The same sorts of difficulties have been encountered by others. 61 Something about
Fuller's particular approach to jurisprudence seems to resist
translation into the language of theory. Indeed, the failures of
the expositors of Fuller's text on this score have been so consistent and so complete that one wonders whether it is something
that cannot be done.
58. R. SuMMEas, supra note 5, at 41.
59. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 51.
61. See, e.g., T. BENDrIT, supra note 44, at 95-99 (labelling Fuller a natural
law thinker); R. SARTOrIUs, supra note 44, at 164-73 (discussing various works
by Fuller).
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D. THE RECONSTRUCTION FALLACY
The real problem, one suspects, lies in the idea of reconstruction itself, in the curiously persistent notion that there is a
theoretical system buried deep within Fuller's jurisprudence
that, with sufficient imagination and discipline, can be rendered
explicit and whole. Cutting against this view is the fact that efforts to reconstruct Fuller's jurisprudence in terms of systematic theory have so far been dismal failures. Summers's own
effort is no exception. There is indeed something almost comic
about the contortions to which he is driven in his attempt to
tame Fuller's jurisprudence: to force from it a theoretical "system" that it does not seem to want to yield. In response to his
mounting frustration, Summers resorts to a whole range of artificial reconstruction techniques: he develops a substitute terminology to replace Fuller's own way of thinking and talking
about experience; 62 when he cannot find anything in Fuller's
own writings to support his thesis, he invokes arguments that,
he weakly claims, are at least elaborated "faithfully" to Fuller's
"evident intuitions; '6 3 he scrounges for hints in Fuller's writings to support the theoretical contentions that he thinks ought
to be made;64 when all else fails, he is left to "fish out scattered
passages and piece them together into a whole, and even, on occasion, read between the lines"; 65 he extrapolates; he explains
away; he lists; he categorizes; sometimes he even pushes Fuller
to one side and assumes center stage himself. 66 The great irony
of all this is that the more Summers engages in these interventionist activities-the more he paraphrases, and reconstructs,
and lists, and categorizes, and pushes and shoves-the more
elusive Fuller's jurisprudence itself becomes. It is almost as if
we were watching Fuller disintegrate before our very eyes. Indeed, there are stretches when he seems to disappear entirely
from view.
The difficulties into which Summers gets himself are not
unique but rather representative of the difficulties others have
encountered in attempts to come to theoretical terms with

62. See text accompanying supra notes 45-51.
63. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 42.
64. See id at 39-40.
65. Id. at 107.
66. See, e.g., id. at 106 (reducing Fuller's argument to a short list of "maxims of process" that, Summers asserts, "Fuller might have developed"); id at
39-40 (developing argument Fuller only "hinted at"); id. at 42-44 (elaborating
thesis that Fuller "did not develop ... as fully as he might have"); supra notes
45 and 47 and accompanying text.
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Fuller's jurisprudence. The difference, if there is one, is only
that these problems appear in Summers's work in perhaps exaggerated form. The problem lies not in Summers's particular
approach to Fuller's jurisprudence, in other words, but in a
shared misconception of the underlying nature of Fuller's
thought and writing.
What Summers shares with others in this respect is the basic assumption that Fuller's jurisprudence falls within a tradition of theoretical scholarship that came into its own in the
nineteenth century, a tradition which in recent years has enjoyed something of a revival of interest among legal scholars. 67
He simply assumes without questioning that Fuller's primary
aim was to give expression to some great, objective, internallycoherent theoretical system. Fuller's failure to live up to this
expectation is then perceived by Summers and other theoryseeking readers as a failure. The perception is that Fuller tried
to do theory but he simply was not good enough at it; he was
not sufficiently disciplined to do it right.
This perception of Fuller and his jurisprudence has been,
in my view, the source of countless and untoward mischiefs. It
is this view that has justified-indeed, fueled-the various awkward and unsuccessful attempts that have been made to discover Fuller's "system" and to fill in aspects of that system that
he presumably left "unfinished." This same perception also un67. For a discussion of the so-called "law-and-theory" movement, see
Teachout, Worlds Beyond Theory: Toward the Expression of an Integrative
Ethicfor SeZf and Culture, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 849, 877-78 & n.25 (1985).
For some reason, Summers and others have chosen simply to ignore the
numerous hints in Fuller's writings which clearly indicate an intent to keep a
critical distance on legal theory and on theory more generally. See, e.g., Fuller,
Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 436 (criticizing the way legal theory, "far from
producing certainty, destroyed a certainty and uniformity which was already
present"); i& at 453 ("[T]he problem of the relation of law and society is not
the sort of issue which can be 'solved' by some 'theory' and then passed over.
It is, to use Radin's suggestive phrase, one of the 'permanent problems of the
law.' "); Fuller, Reason and Fiat, supra note 1, at 376 (while praising Cardozo
for giving expression to a "deeper kind of coherence," Fuller observes that
"[t]he thread of connection in [Cardozo's] philosophy is found not in theories
or doctrines, but in a persistent effort to solve certain basic and recurring
problems of the law"); id. at 392-94 (asserting the superiority of the nontheoretical common law approach over the theory-based approach of civil law).
This is enough to suggest that Fuller, like Burke, may have found theory, if
not actually inconsistent with, at least not the key to the development of an
integrated vision of experience. See infra text accompanying notes 78-89. For
the view that theory as a mode of organizing language and experience may be
incompatible with the development of an integrated approach to experience,
see Teachout, supra, at 877-93.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1092

[Vol. 70:1073

derlies the destructive belief, so transparently reflected in Summers's own study, that Fuller's thought can somehow be torn
away from the language in which Fuller himself expressed it
and restated as part of an objective system of theory. The fundamental problem with all this, as suggested above, is that it
leads to a portrait of Fuller and his jurisprudence that ultimately does not ring true.
Yet it is one thing to criticize the theory-seeking approach
that Summers exemplifies here, and quite another to suggest
an alternative approach that is likely to provide any better access to Fuller's thought and writing, that will more adequately
reveal and convey its true nature. If Fuller's jurisprudential vision does not translate into the terms of an objective theoretical
system, then what is it we should be looking for in his essays?
If theory does not provide "the thread of connection" that ties
Fuller's essays together, what does? If, as suggested above, 68
Fuller seeks through his essays to give expression to "a deeper
kind of coherence," where do we find that "deeper" coherence,
and what form does it take?
III. TERMS OF ACCESS: OUTLINE OF AN
ALTERNATIVE CRITICAL APPROACH
It is here that I want to suggest a slight but important shift
in perspective. We will never understand Fuller, I want to argue, as long as we cling to the notion that his essays form the
building blocks of some great external theoretical system. To
get to the heart of his jurisprudence, we must regard his essays
rather as ethical performances that collectively give expression
to an integrated ethical vision. They do so, moreover, not simply by advocating that vision on the surface but by actually performing certain important character-shaping capacities. We
must regard Fuller's essays as we would the ethical compositions of the great writers of eighteenth century English literature-Swift, Johnson, Austen, and Burke69 -rather than as a
form of systematic theory of the sort that came into its own in
the nineteenth century.
To do so requires something of a shift in the nature of the
68. See supra notes 1, 16-35 and accompanying text.
69. For a recent and extremely thoughtful treatment of the writings of
Swift, Johnson, Austen, and Burke from the perspective of what they have to
offer in the way of an ethical education for the modem lawyer, see J. WHrTE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 114-230 (1984), reviewed in Teachout,

supra note 67.
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questions that we bring to bear upon Fuller's essays. Instead of
seeking to discover Fuller's "theory," we should seek to discover "the vision" toward which Fuller's jurisprudence aspires.
Similarly, rather than asking questions aimed at revealing
Fuller's "system," we should ask about "the characteristic mode
of his intelligence" as it is brought to bear upon experience.
This is the sort of approach we would employ, after all, if we
were seeking to come to terms with the ethical vision expressed, for example, in Johnson's essays, or in Austen's novels,
or in Burke's great integrative compositions.7" Of course we
could seek to discover Johnson's system-or Austen's, or
Burke's-but such an inquiry would not carry us very far toward an understanding of the ethical vision expressed in their
respective works. So we have to develop a critical approach
that will somehow open up doors that remain closed to an inquiry predisposed to finding answers in terms of theory or system. And focusing on the vision toward which Fuller's
jurisprudence aspires, and on the characteristic mode of the intelligence we see at work, provides at least a starting point.
The crucial thing to realize is that Fuller addresses us in
his jurisprudence not simply as theorists but as whole persons,
and that this requires, at least for those trained in theory, a
special kind of reading. Responding to Fuller simply as a fellow theorist, as Summers for the most part seems to do, is not
enough because such a perspective leaves out the heart of what
Fuller has to say. Therefore we must put aside the theorist in
us, at least for the moment, and approach Fuller's jurisprudence as would that more complex and integrated character,
"the intelligent reader." We must bring to bear on our reading,
that is to say, all the sentiments and attitudes that we bring to
bear on experience as we actually live it; we must bring to bear,
as Burke would insist, all our "prejudices."'7 ' Our central effort
should be to reveal the world of expectation and value in
Fuller's writings, not in some artificially abstracted form, but as
it is actually expressed. We must learn to read Fuller, in short,
on his own terms.
We must regard Fuller's essays, to carry this approach a
step further, as complete works, as compositions whose meaning is to be found not simply at the level of rational argument
but in all those elements that together constitute their essential
70. See J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 138-230.
71. E. BURKE, supra note 54, at 98-110. On Burke's use of the word
"prejudices" as an integrative term, see J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 212-13.
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"imaginative design. '72 To what extent, we should ask, is the
meaning of Fuller's jurisprudence shaped by the underlying
pattern and movement of his essays? by the way passages and
sentences and words are put together? by the particular use
that is made of imagery and metaphor? by what literary critics
call voice and tone? What is it that contributes to our sense of
the integrity of the vision to which Fuller's essays cumulatively
give expression? What sort of relationships are established between theme and structure? between the values explicitly advocated at the level of surface argument and the ethical
capacities-the particular capacities of mind and character-actually performed in his essays? These questions could go on,
but this should suffice to indicate the essentially literary nature
of the inquiry in which we must engage if we want to come to
terms with the ethical vision expressed in Fuller's jurisprudence and to grasp what it is that contributes to our sense of
the underlying integrity of that vision.
It may turn out in the end, of course, that taking such an
approach will get us no closer to the heart of Fuller's jurisprudence than does Summers's own frustrated effort. The very attempt to substitute this literary approach for Summers's
theory-seeking one may represent a classic case of overcorrection-a classic instance, to call upon one of Fuller's favorite
metaphors, of rushing too precipitously to "the light side of a
tipping boat. '73 But the experiment is worth the try. The most
we can attempt to do here in any event is to suggest the form
that such an alternative reading of Fuller's jurisprudence might
take.
IV. THE ESSENTIAL THRUST OF FULLER'S
JURISPRUDENCE: TOWARD THE EXPRESSION
OF AN "INTEGRAL REALITY"
Before turning to an examination of the substance of
Fuller's jurisprudence, two preliminary observations need to be
made: first, when we deal with Fuller's jurisprudence, we are
dealing with a jurisprudence that embraces truly complex aspirations; and second, those aspirations are expressed not only in
terms of some set of explicitly stated ends but structurally as
well. The first of these observations ought not to trouble us
72. For a thoughtful treatment of the way in which the "imaginative design" of a work shapes its ultimate meaning, see R. BROWER, THE FIELDS OF
LIGHT:. AN EXPERIMENT IN CRITIcAL READING 31-41 (1951).
73.

L. FULaR, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 717.
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greatly because we too, after all, are creatures of complex aspiration, and so is the culture that we have inherited and, indeed,
our vision of what we want that culture to be. But we are so
accustomed to philosophical theories or systems that posit,
often in some neat hierarchical fashion, a single ultimate end
around which everything else dutifully organizes that we are
initially bewildered by a jurisprudence such as Fuller's that aspires simultaneously to a complex of ultimate ends. Thus it is
quite accurate, indeed, necessary, to assert that the ultimate aspiration of Fuller's jurisprudence is to establish a jurisprudence
responsive to the "complex and moving reality that actually exists"74-that is, a truly honest jurisprudence; and to establish
an ethically integrated approach to language and experience; 75
and to elaborate the conditions essential for the establishment
of a "good social order."7 6 To Fuller, these several ends are not
separate and distinct, but all intimately interconnected, the
achievement of one impossible without the simultaneous
achievement of the others. Our initial effort, accordingly, must
be to develop a critical approach capable of recognizing the
complex character of the vision to which Fuller's jurisprudence
aspires.
The second point is best understood by analogizing the
problem of approaching Fuller's jurisprudence to that involved
in approaching the task of social design. The central and most
difficult challenge is finding a way to keep the whole complex
constantly in view. And the great pitfall to be avoided is giving
in to the tendency to consider explicitly stated ends in isolation
from the means by which they are achieved. Fuller puts it this
way in the context of a discussion of how to think responsibly
about what is involved in the design of a good social order:
Any social goal, to be meaningful, must be conceived in structural
terms, not simply as something that happens to people when their social ordering is rightly directed. In individual morality ... the life
worthy of emulation is one that forms a coherent pattern, not one
of desirable states of mind
that is manipulated to bring about a series
77

and body. So I believe it is with society.
So it is in Fuller's jurisprudence. The vision to which it ultimately gives expression is not one that can be described solely
in terms of a set of "desirable states." We must focus attention
74. I& For a discussion of Fuller's openness to experience, see infr text
accompanying notes 78-89.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 90-103 and text following note 103.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 149-150 and text following note 150.

77. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 57.
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as well on the "coherent pattern" of dealing with experience
that is revealed in his essays, for it is in that pattern-in
Fuller's characteristic mode of approach-that we may ultimately find what is most "worthy of emulation" in his jurisprudence. It is in this aspect of his essays, it may turn out in the
end, that the real and important ethical education they have to
offer primarily lies. To get to the heart of Fuller's jurisprudence, consequently, we must approach it in a circular fashion,
moving back and forth between explicitly embraced aspirations
and their expression "in structural terms."

A. OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE: DEVELOPING A JURISPRUDENCE
RESPONSIVE TO A "COMPLEX AND MOVING REALITY"
But if the reality we confront is difficult and dangerous, nothing can
78
be gained by obscuring its true nature.

If we begin with the question, What can be said about the
characteristic mode of Fuller's intelligence as it is brought to
bear upon experience? the first and most striking thing to be
noticed is Fuller's extraordinary openness to experience. That
Fuller was not interested in the construction of closed theoretical systems is evident from the statements he left us about
what he saw to be the basic nature and purpose of the philosophical enterprise. "What should be sought" from philosophy,
Fuller believed, "is not a principle that will exclude and render
irrelevant the disturbing parts of reality, but an enlargement of
view, an opening up of areas of meaning that have been lost
from sight. '7 9 Again and again in Fuller's essays, we find the
expression of the same concern, the same awareness of how
systematic theory, whatever its potential value, often tends to
close off and limit our ability to see experience in all its com80
plexity. In his Problems of Jurisprudence,
for instance,
Fuller warns against the "distortions" that are created "by our
penchant for patterns, that makes us see neat diagrams instead
of the complex and moving reality that actually exists." ' This
phrase, perhaps better than any other, captures the commitment Fuller makes in his own jurisprudence to deal with com78. Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms-A Review
of Robert L. Hale's "Freedom Through Law," 54 COLUM. L. REv. 70, 73 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Fuller, Legal and Economic Freedoms].
79. L. FULLER, Philosophyfor the PracticingLawyer, in THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 282, 286 (K. Winston
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as L. FULLER, PracticingLawyer].
80. L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22.
81. Id. at 717.
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plex experience honestly. It is a commitment that lies at the
very foundation of his jurisprudential endeavor: to discover
and develop a critical mode capable of expressing "the complex
and moving reality that actually exists."
This helps explain what is so wrongheaded about the complaint that, because Fuller never got around to setting down a
complete statement of his theoretical system, his jurisprudence
is a problem. It also explains why attempts to complete the system that he left "unfinished" are not just ill-advised but almost
certainly doomed to failure. Given Fuller's view of the nature
of the philosophical enterprise, it makes no more sense to complain about Fuller's not having completed his "system" than it
does to complain about Samuel Johnson's not having completed
his. In both cases the complaint is based upon the assumption
that it was the writer's aim to reduce "the complex and moving
reality" with which he was dealing to the terms of a theoretical
system, an assumption in many respects as widely off the mark
in the one case as it is in the other. To say that neither of these
writers aspired to discover a universal theoretical fix for our
problems, however, is not to say that neither expressed an ethical vision. Indeed, the opposite is the case. In the same way it
can be said of Johnson's essays, it can be said of Fuller's: they
give expression to an ethical vision of great integrity.
To free Fuller's jurisprudence from the requirement that it
give expression to a theoretical system that is coherent and capable of being completed, is to allow us to see Fuller's jurisprudence as it really is. Yet, in releasing that particular
expectation, it is important not to stray too far in the opposite
direction. It is important not to think of Fuller's jurisprudence
as consisting of nothing more than a bundle of ad hoc propositions or utterly particularized insights. Reading Fuller presents
us with the same sort of problem in this respect that reading
Burke does, and what has been said about Burke in this regard
applies as well to Fuller. As Professor Gerald Chapman has observed, efforts to abstract a "system" from Burke's writings
universally have failed to capture that elusive but distinctive
quality that we call "Burke's sense. ' 82 They have consistently
yielded something "bleached of the full meaning and value of
the context." 8 3 Yet at the same time it would be foolish not to
recognize the underlying unity and integrity of the vision to
which Burke gives expression. In an illuminating passage,
82.

G. CHAPmAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE PRACTCAL IMAGINATION 2 (1967).

83. Mc
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Chapman suggests the nature of the approach one must take if
one wants to come to meaningful terms with Burke:
One must search his particular judgments, then, not for a system,
but for a characteristic activity, of which they are ad hoc expressions.
The unity in Burke's thought would seem to lie in the character of his
intelligence as it operates upon the life of his time. It is a mode of
imaginative practicality which has appeared in English culture within
many very different and often cross theoretical positions-a peculiar
fusion of poetic conception and literary brilliance, ethical awareness
and religious reverence, preference for concrete inquiry and compromise, common sense 84and sense of duty, and what Fox called a "reverse of selfishness."

I do not mean to suggest that all of these epithets apply with
the same force to Fuller as to Burke-although on the whole
they are strikingly applicable. What I do want to suggest, however, is that this represents the sort of approach one must take
to Fuller's jurisprudence, and to the "problem" of its incompleteness as theory--or the virtue of its openness-if one is to
come to fair terms with its particular character. What one
must look for in reading Fuller, as in reading Burke, is not a
"system," but "a mode of imaginative practicality" that assumes
this complex form.
To view Fuller's jurisprudential essays in this more complex light reveals an aspect of their character that under a systems approach would go unappreciated: the fact that their very
openness, their refusal to tend toward a closed theoretical system, forms an essential aspect of their underlying integrity.
The similarity between the way Fuller's essays work as a body
of ethical literature and the way Johnson's essays work in this
respect is an intriguing one. As one critic has said of Johnson:
Johnson's tendency to think by recognizing and including contraries is at work not only within each of the essays but across them as
well. One essay will often respond to a conclusion reached in another,
placing it in a slightly different light ....
This is not a defect in Johnson's work but a consequence of its
essential character: the conclusions reached are themselves subject to
reexamination and complication, to a further process of thought; they
are not offered as building blocks of a theoretical system. His conclusions are in this sense open-ended or presumptive in character, structurally tentative. Not that a particular conclusion is not firm, but it
must be understood for what it is, as inextricably part of a larger system of expression. It is firm only in the context that gives it life
and
85
meaning and renders it a principle rather than a commonplace.

So it is in Fuller's jurisprudence. It is part of the integrity of
84. Id- at 12.
85. J. WHrrE, supra note 69, at 152-53.
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his essays that they are in this sense "structurally tentative"-performing in the relationship that they establish one to the
other, and to what has not yet been said or observed, an openness not just to experience, but to the kind of correction and
complication that may come from viewing that experience "in a
slightly different light."
For the moment the important thing to see is the way in
which this openness to experience on Fuller's part, and this
special receptivity to the tensions and contradictions of experience,8 6 are central aspects of his search for a coherence deeper
than that offered by theory. Underlying Fuller's jurisprudence
is a perspective very similar in this respect to that which underlies Burke's distinction between that which is "metaphysically
[or theoretically] true" and that which is "morally and politically" so. 8 7 Fuller's great effort, like Burke's, is to develop a ju86. This special receptivity is reflected, among other places, in Fuller's insistence that "it is better to accept frankly a state of unresolved conflict or tension in our reasoning than to purchase consistency at the cost of needed
prenises." Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 377. Fuller's insistence
upon seeing the contrary and inconsistent tendencies of human experience,
not as problems to be eliminated, but rather as forming the very essence of
that experience, forms yet another major strand of Fuller's larger jurisprudential vision, one to which we will return later. See infra text accompanying
notes 194-216.
87. In a famous passage, Burke says:
The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity;, and, therefore, no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature or to the quality
of his affairs. When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and
boasted of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to decide
that the artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade or totally negligent of their duty. The simple governments are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them. If you were to contemplate society in
but one point of view, all these simple modes of polity are infinitely
captivating. In effect each would answer its single and much more
perfectly than the more complex is able to attain all its complex purposes. But it is better that the whole should be imperfectly and
anomalously answered than that, while some parts are provided for
with great exactness, others might be totally neglected or perhaps materially injured by the overcare of a favorite member.
The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and in
proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of middle, incapable of
definition, but not impossible to be discerned. The rights of men in
governments are their advantages; and these are often in balances between differences of good, in compromises sometimes between good
and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a
computing principle: adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing,
morally and not metaphysically, or mathematically, true moral
denominations.
E. BURKE, supra note 54, at 70-71 (emphasis in original).
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risprudence that is responsive to a reality in which "the nature
of man is intricate" and "the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity." 8 It is to develop a jurisprudence that
is, in the Burkean sense, not just "metaphysically," but "morally and politically" true.8 9
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ETHICALLY INTEGRATED
JURISPRUDENCE
It was not enough, however, for Fuller to develop a jurisprudence capable of dealing with the complex reality honestly;
it was also critically important to him to give expression to an
ethically integrated view of experience. To understand why
this assumed such central importance to Fuller, it is necessary
first to identify and explain the central problem to which his
jurisprudence was in large part intended as a response. That
problem, in brief, was the ethical disintegration of language, a
disintegration which, as Fuller saw it, threatened the underlying integrity of the culture itself. The great and ultimate task
Fuller sets for himself in his jurisprudence, accordingly, is the
reconstitution of the inherited language in ethically integrated
terms. His central aim and struggle is to develop a jurisprudential language capable of giving expression to "an integral
reality."90
This preoccupation with the ethical character of the language we use was not an idle preoccupation on Fuller's part,
unrelated to the great problems of constituting a decent and
just social order with which jurisprudence has traditionally
been concerned. For, in Fuller's view, the ethical reconstitution
of language was an essential precondition to the establishment
of a "good social order."91 Without integrity of the one, there
88. Id. at 70.
89. In this and other respects, Fuller's jurisprudence shares a great deal in
common with Alexander Bickel's. For an excellent discussion of the Burkean
underpinnings of Bickel's jurisprudence, see Kronman, Alexander Bickel's
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1605 (1985).
90. The phrase is taken from the following sentence: "In the field of purposive human activity ...value and being are not two different things, but two
aspects of an integral reality." L. FULLER, QUEST, supra note 23, at 11.
Although Fuller uses the phrase in the particular context of an effort to develop and give expression to an integrated view of "value" and "being," the
idea of giving expression to an "integral reality" is not so confined in his
jurisprudence.
91. The phrase "good social order" is one that Fuller used. L. FULLER,
Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 49. The interrelationship between Fuller's
efforts to reconstitute language (toward the end of creating a complex ethical
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could be no integrity of the other. That is why in Fuller's jurisprudence the two activities often appear as simultaneous pursuits: the development of an ethically integrated approach to
language and experience, and the elaboration of conditions essential to the maintenance or creation of a good social order.
Fuller's jurisprudence opens upon a world in which language
and culture are inextricably interconnected, the character of
one reciprocally dependent upon the character of the other.
Thus a great deal turns upon the outcome of the struggle to reconstitute language in more complex and integrated terms. If
character is fate, as Heraclitus said, then the very fate of our
culture hangs in the balance.
Fuller's jurisprudence falls, then, within a classic tradition
which goes back to Plato's time and perhaps earlier. It is instructive in this regard to compare the basic predicament in
which Fuller found himself with that which Plato inherited.
For even though these two writers are separated in time by
more than two thousand years-between them, indeed, lie the
rise and fall of entire civilizations-fascinating parallels exist in
the nature of the problems with which each had to deal and in
the character of the response that 'each developed to those
problems.
For Plato the problem lay in the fact that the inherited
Greek language was not ethically integrated.92 It was a language in which terms of excellence were unconnected to terms
of virtue. Thus it was quite possible to talk, as the sophists in
fact did, about the pursuit of excellence as something quite separate and apart from the pursuit of the good, the just, and the
true. This way of thinking and talking about experience, in
Plato's view, had disintegrative consequences for self and culture. It represented a destructive force that threatened the integrity of the self and precluded the establishment of the
conditions essential for the creation of a truly stable and vital
community. That is why in the Gorgias93 Plato takes the solanguage of "combination") and his attempt to establish the conditions that
would make possible the realization of a good social order (based upon a substantive ethic of "combination") is discussed infra text accompanying notes
126-185. As that discussion demonstrates, Fuller's views concerning the constitution of language and his views relating to the constitution of a good social
order were both governed by the same underlying ethic.
92. For an illuminating discussion of the essentially literary character of
the problem with which Plato was faced, see J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 93-

113.
93.

PLATO, GORGIAS (T.Irwin trans. 1979).
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phistic rhetoricians to task for perpetuating a disintegrative
way of thinking and talking about experience. That is also why
his own effort took the form that it did: the reconstitution of
Greek language in ethically integrated terms. It was because of
his deeply held view that the development of an ethically integrated approach to language and experience was a crucial precondition to the establishment of a just and stable social order.
Fuller also found himself confronted with forces of disintegration, but in his case the problem did not lie in the state or
character of inherited cultural language. It lay rather in the
rise of positivism, and in the positivists' insistence upon dividing the universe of discourse into two separate and distinct languages: a language of "is" (or "fact" or "being") on the one
hand, and a language of "ought" (or "value") on the other. The
rise of positivism represented to Fuller a potentially destructive
force, one which threatened to undo the integrated cultural
perspective which Plato and others down through the ages had
labored so mightily to establish, perpetuate, and refine. What
the sophists were to Plato, in other words, the positivists-and,
to the extent they picked up on positivist tendencies, the legal
realists 9 4-- were to Fuller.
There were important differences, of course, between the
positivists and the legal realists. The chief vice of the former,
as Fuller saw it, lay in their radical embrace of "rationalism," a
rationalism cut off from the "sentiments and attitudes" that
give life and meaning to a culture.9 5 This was in essence the
94. See generallyFuller, Legal Realism
7 , supra note 6. Fuller criticized the
tendency on the part of some of the legal realists to assume that "neutral observation of official behavior constitutes the whole of legal science," ic. at 429
n.3, and particularly criticized what he viewed as the sterile and essentially
conservative behaviorism of Underhill Moore:
The realist condemns the traditional method for its mistaken assumption that you can limit the influence of facts to those tagged as legally
relevant, and for the corollary assumption that it is profitable to discuss the solution of controversies on the basis of textbook outlines of
the facts. Yet precisely the same fallacy. . . is contained in Moore's
approach.
Id at 456. The chief failing of the legal realists, as Fuller saw it, was that in
their preoccupation with describing the law as it really operates (often not
very accurately because of their behaviorist blinders) and with developing a
conception of law that conforms to the reality, they tended to ignore the potential shaping force of the law. "The law has always to weigh against the advantages of conforming to life, the advantagesof reshapingand clarifyjing life,
bearing always in mind that its attempts to reshape life may miscarry, or may
cost more than they achieve." Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
95. Id at 457 n.69. These "sentiments and attitudes" play the same sort of
community-establishing role in Fuller's world that "prejudices" do in Burke's
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basis of Fuller's quarrel with the great English legal positivist,
9 6
H.L.A. Hart, over the relationship of law and morality. Fuller
was convinced that radical separation of the two, as Hart
seemed to advocate,9 would ultimately lead to the disintegration of culture.98 And there was much in the experience that
led up to World War II, one has to admit in retrospect, to lend
support to Fuller's position. Indeed, one could view Fuller's jurisprudence as forming a kind of continuing objection to what
Burke called "the dissolving acids of rationalism."99
Yet if Fuller was critical of the positivists' radical embrace
of a soulless rationalism, he was equally critical of those who
rushed to embrace the opposite extreme-those legal realists,
for example, who utterly dismissed the legitimacy and importance of "reason"' in law and culture, and advanced the cynical
and destructive view that in the end it all comes down to mere
"intuition," "fiat," "power," or some form of arbitrary preference.1° ° If the radical embrace of "rationalism" divorced from
the constraints and aspirations of cultural tradition was disintegrative in tendency, so also, and perhaps even more so, was the
radical rejection of the role of reason in law and culture. 0 1
What both the positivists and the legal realists shared in common, in other words, was a view of the world and a language
world. See J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 212-13 (discussing Burke's use of "prejudice" as an integrative term); cf E. BURKE, supra note 54, at 98-99 (reflecting
Burke's special use of the term "prejudices").
96. The classic debate between Hart and Fuller is found in Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.REV. 593 (1958) and
Fuller, Reply to ProfessorHart supra note 23.
97. See Hart, supra note 96, at 621-29.
98. See Fuller, Reply to ProfessorHar4 supra note 23, at 646-61.
99. See L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 724 (discussing
Burke's expression).
100. See eg., Fuller, Reason and Fiat supra note 1, at 389-90. "The revolutionary may seek to undermine the established order by demonstrating that
[the law] is merely the expression of the will of a ruling class. He may argue
that law is fiat, and say: 'Let us see to it that it becomes our fiat instead of
theirs."' I& at 389 (emphasis in original). If any group of contemporary legal
scholars can lay claim to this fiat-celebrating patch of the old realist mantle, it

is probably the Critical Legal Studies school. See CriticalLegal Studies Symposiun, supra note 2.
101. Fuller notes:
If there is any need, it is to get rid of the lingering traces of a philosophy that I like to think is essentially alien to the American spirit.
This is the philosophy which by depriving law and ethics of the reason
branch of the antinomy of reason and fiat leaves them with only the
branch of fiat to stand on.
Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 394.
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grounded in the radical separation of "reason" from "intuition,"
"fact" from "value," and "is" from "ought."
That is why Fuller's primary jurisprudential effort took
the form that it did. Much like Plato's in the Gorgias, Fuller's
basic effort was to establish-in part to preserve, in part to create-a truly integrated approach to the organization of language and experience. Initially, this effort took the form of an
insistence that the "is" and "ought" of legal rules should be regarded, not as belonging to separate universes of discourse, but
as aspects of an "integral reality."'30 2 But as Fuller's jurisprudence developed, this initial impulse spread to embrace the opposed terms of the other classic antinomies with which
jurisprudence had traditionally been concerned, such as justice
and efficiency, form and substance, means and ends, principle
and practicality, excellence and virtue, and "the principle of
shared commitment" and "the principle of legality." The ultimate aim was to develop a way of thinking and talking about
experience by which all of these traditionally opposed terms
10 3
could come to be understood as forming an "integral reality."'
It was to create a complex language capable of expressing the
underlying relationships in terms other than those of mere opposition-a language of real integrative force.
Fuller's jurisprudence and Plato's philosophy share a great
deal then. Both efforts proceed upon an appreciation of the essential interconnectedness of language, individual character,
and culture; both are based in the recognition that the way we
use words powerfully shapes the character not only of ourselves as individuals but also of the culture of which we are a
part. That is why at the very heart of both Fuller's jurisprudence and Plato's philosophy is that common struggle to give
expression to an ethically integrated view of the world.
Moreover, both proceed in the classic pattern of dialectic.
Fuller's essays and Plato's dialogues characteristically begin
with an inherited and disintegrative way of thinking and talking about experience, and move, through an intermediate step
of complication and perplexity and paradox, toward the ultimate reconstitution of language in ethically integrated terms.
Finally, both Fuller's essays and Plato's dialogues have the
same large end: not simply to move the reader to a more complex and integrated understanding of experience, but also to
cultivate in the reader those capacities of mind and character
102. See supra note 90.
103. See supra note 90.
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that are necessary to undertake such a continuing endeavor on
his own. These are aspects of Fuller's jurisprudence to which
we will turn shortly. Before doing so, however, it is first necessary to recognize that in Fuller's jurisprudence the dialectical
impulse assumes a very special form.
V. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF POLARITY IN FULLER'S
JURISPRUDENCE: CARVING OUT
A "MIDDLE WAY"
When we speak of the "middle way" we are apt to think of the safe
and easy way, the way that dodges the responsibilities of a clear-cut,
logical position. For [the classical Greek mind], the middle way was
not the soft way, but the hard way, the way that took skill and compefrom which the clumsy and ill-favored were most likely to
tence10 and
4
fall.

If there is any single impulse that gives shape and meaning
to Fuller's jurisprudence, it is that embodied in what he referred to as "the principle of polarity." 10 5 This impulse shapes
104. L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 31. In this passage
Fuller is referring specifically to Aristotle, but his description of Aristotle's approach also serves perfectly to describe the classical Greek approach to experience with its central emphasis upon achievement of what the Roman poet
Horace called "the golden mean."
It is fair to ask in this respect whether, in this essay, I have not given too
much attention to similarities between Fuller's and Plato's approaches and,
conversely, paid too little attention to Fuller's clear reliance in his jurisprudence upon Aristotle. It has been said that we are all either Platonists or Aristotelians. If that is true, then may not Fuller be more accurately described as
an Aristotelian than as a Platonist-especially in view of the fact that Fuller
gives the lead-off position in his Problems of Jurisprudencenot to Plato, but to
Aristotle?
My response here must take the form of confession and avoidance. It is
true that in some respects Fuller was more of an Aristotelian than a Platonist.
It is fairly clear, for example, that he would have shared Aristotle's criticism
of Plato for failing to distinguish between the methods to be applied to philosophy and those to be applied to the practical art of government and life. See
ARisToTLELES, THE PoLr cs OF ARISTOTLE ch. II. v, §§ 16-28, at 52-55 (E.
Barker trans. reprint 1974). But with respect to the aspects of Fuller's jurisprudence with which we are particularly concerned here-that is, with his
central effort to develop an integrated approach to the organization of language and experience-any opposition that otherwise might exist between
Plato and Aristotle falls away. Such an integrative effort lies at the heart of
both Plato's Gorgias,see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text, and Aristotle's NichomacheanEthics, see L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at
31. Nor should this surprise us, because carving out a "middle way" as Fuller
describes it here was not unique to either Plato or Aristotle, but a central defining characteristic of the classical Greek mind.
105. Fuller, Reason and Fiat supra note 1, at 381. One of the great defects
of Summers's book, in my view, is his failure to make anything of this central
shaping notion in his analysis of Fuller's jurisprudence. Cf.Winston, supra
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the essential features of Fuller's jurisprudence much as the genetic structure of the parental chromosomes shapes the features of the infant, child, and mature adult. Fuller got the idea
of polarity from Morris Cohen, 106 although it is perhaps more
accurate to say that Cohen's notion struck in him a deeply responsive chord. It gave expression to a mode of approaching
experience that was at least already latent in Fuller's view of
the world, if not already partially realized.
To appreciate what Fuller understood by polarity, it is instructive to observe how he invokes the concept in his classic
essay Reason and Fiat in Case Law.10 7 In this essay Fuller argues that the problem with the conventional approach to the
question of whether judicial decision should be seen as a product of "reason" or "fiat" is the tendency to take an "either-or"
position. The question as it traditionally has been posed-is judicial decision the product of reason or fiat (or subjective preference or political inclination)-is, in Fuller's view, a false
10 8
dilemma. To respond to the "antinomy of reason and fiat"
by seizing upon one branch of the antinomy to the exclusion of
the other is inadequate. What is required is a more complex
way of viewing the underlying relationships:
Men have never been very ready to acknowledge that their thinking contains anything like an unresolved state of tension. They have
never been happy with what Morris Cohen calls "the principle of polarity," according to which notions apparently contradictory form indispensable complements for one another. In dealing with the
antinomy of reason and fiat, the main effort of the various109
schools of
legal philosophy has been to obliterate one of its branches.

Fuller then goes on to show how an intelligent appreciation of
the way judicial decision is actually done, and how it functions
at its best, must embrace both elements, must recognize that
both elements form "indispensable complements" of any sound
process of judgment.
To Fuller, then, "polarity" is shorthand for the way "notions apparently contradictory form indispensable complements
for one another." It is a perspective-transforming concept in
the sense that it moves us from a perspective from which we
regard the contrary tendencies that form human experience in
note 44, at 3 (stating that "Fuller was much taken with Cohen's wide-ranging

'principle of polarity.' ").
106. Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 381. Fuller's debt to Cohen is
discussed in Winston, supra note 44, at 3-4.
107. Fuller, Reason and Fiat supra note 1.

108. Id. at 381.
109. Id.
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terms of simplistic opposition toward an alternative perspective

from which we can see the same tendencies in terms of more
complex relationships of opposition and interdependency. Polarity in this sense bears a great affinity to Keats's notion of
"negative capability": the capability (uniquely manifested, as
Keats saw it, in Shakespeare's genius) of holding two conflicting ideas in the mind at the same time without an undue striving after one or the other. 1 0 The comparison is a particularly
helpful one because it underscores the fact that what is involved is not an idea, a method, or a system, but a critical and
creative capacity. It is very much what Coleridge had in mind
when he commented on the unique capacity of the poetic imagination for effecting a "reconciliation of opposite or discordant
qualities.'
So conceived, polarity is not something new with Fuller, or
with Cohen before him, but rather expressive of an imaginative
and ethical capacity performed and reflected in many of the
great works of classic literature. If we confine our attention
solely to its manifestation in works of eighteenth century English literature, we can find it reflected in many different contexts and forms. It is represented, for example, in Swift's
brilliant demonstration in his Tale of a Tub 1 of the pitfalls
that attend us when we organize thought and language in terms
of false or simplistic antitheses; it is reflected in the remarkable
capacity that Johnson demonstrates in his classic RamblerM
essays for holding before us two contrary impulses, both in full
force, without rushing to embrace the one or the other; the
same impulse lies at the heart of our education in Austen's classic novel, Emma," 4 as we ,move with Austen's heroine from a
sentimental toward a critical appreciation of language and ex110. Keats put it this way:
[S]everal things dove-tailed in my mind, and at once it struck me what
quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature,
and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously-I mean Negative
Capability,that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties,
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and
reason.
J. KEATS, SELFCTED PoETRY AND LETTERS 308 (Rinehart rev. ed. 1969) (emphasis in original).
111.
112.

2 S. COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LrrERARIA 12 (J. Shawcross ed. 1907).
J. SWIFT, supra note 2. Tale of a Tub is discussed in J. WHITE, supra

note 69, at 114-37.
113. S. JOHNSON, RAMBLER (W. Bate & A. Straus Yale ed. 1969). Rambler
is discussed in J. WHIrrE, supra note 69, at 138-62.
114. J. AUSTEN,EMMA (R.Chapman 3d ed. 1933). Emma is discussed in J.
WHITE, supra note 69, at 163-91.
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perience; and it is performed again and again at every level of
Burke's great constitutional composition, Reflections on the
5
Revolution in France (hereinafter referred to as Reflections),"
among other places in his insistence upon seeing values not in
the abstract, nor in terms of simplistic opposition, but in
"combination." 116
It is in this broad and classic sense that polarity is embraced and performed by Fuller in his jurisprudential essays.
At bottom what is involved is a complex double impulse: on
the one hand, the rejection of an inherited (or emerging) mode
of organizing thought and language that allows or encourages
us to view experience in terms of false or simplistic oppositions;
on the other hand, the creation of an alternative critical approach that leads us to see that experience in terms of more
complex and dynamic relationships of opposition and interdependency. This fundamental impulse, whatever one calls it and
however it is described, lies at the very heart of Fuller's jurisprudence. It supplies the elemental force and design for what
eventually emerges as a deeply integrative ethic.
We can see the polarity ethic reflected in many different
forms and at many different levels in Fuller's jurisprudence. It
is reflected, for example, in Fuller's praise of Cardozo for having found a way to embrace, rather than to evade, the antinomies that in large part constitute legal experience. 117 The same
impulse underlies Fuller's view that the argument over
whether judicial decision is governed by "logic" or "policy" is in
large part based upon a phony opposition.118 It is implicit as
well in his impatience with those who worry too much about
whether legal judgment is a product of "rationalism" or of "intuition" (not a distinction that long "bothers people busy solving problems").": 9 The same basic perspective is reflected in
115. E. BURKE,supra note 54. Reflections is discussed in J. WHITE, supra
note 69, at 192-230.
116. For a discussion of Burke's achievement in developing a complex language of "combination," see J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 200-02.
117. Fuller says:
For Cardozo the law embraced many antinomies, but one of the greatest and most pervasive of these was that of reason and fiat.... His
view rejected neither branch of the antinomy of reason and fiat. For
him law was by its limitations fiat, by its aspirations reason, and the

whole view of it involved a recognition of both its limitations and its
aspirations.
Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 376-77.
118. See Fuller, Williston, supra note 16, at 8-9.
119. L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 700-01.

1986]

FULLER'S JURISPRUDENCE

1109

Fuller's view that the relationship between "law" and "society"
is not that of simple subservience of one to the other but describable rather in terms of "mutual action and reaction."' 2 0
The polarity impulse finds expression not simply at the
level of rational argument in Fuller's jurisprudence, moreover,
but in its deepest metaphorical fabric as well. This contributes
to our sense of the underlying integrity of his vision of the
world. To give an illustration, in describing the opposition between Austin's positivist view of law and Savigny's custombased view, Fuller likens the underlying relationship to that
1
which exists between the "two blades of a pair of scissors."' 2
The difference is that "Savigny kept his eye on the Society
blade .... Austin... on the Law blade."'2 2 This in large part
explains the "confusion" that Blackstone makes out of these
two views of law in his Commentaries. Fuller notes that:
Blackstone shifted his eye from one blade to the other and gave us
the confused account in which, on the one hand, he bases the common

law on custom, and, on the other, informs us that the authoritative
statement of this custom is to be found only in court decisions. As if
to add to the confusion, he then lays down rules for determining
when a custom should be recognized by the law. We avoid all these
that both blades
difficulties by the simple expedient of recognizing
3
cut, and that neither can cut without the other.12

The nice thing about the scissors imagery, of course, quite apart
from the fact that it helpfully describes the dynamic relationship of reciprocity that exists between law and society, is that it
perfectly captures the complex relationship of opposition and
interdependency that the polarity perspective requires. While
the blades of the scissors in one sense stand in opposition to one
another, "both blades cut, and.., neither can cut without the
other."
The scissors imagery is not the only such imagery we encounter in Fuller's essays. At another point, in insisting upon
the importance of not rushing to embrace one branch as opposed to the other of the classic antinomies that form the heart
of legal experience, Fuller invites us to imagine "a magnet with
only one pole" or an "electric battery that produces only a positive current."'12 These metaphors are not simply sugarcoating
120. Fuller, Legal Realim, supra note 6, at 452. "Though we are under the
necessity of opposing them to one another we must recognize that each implies
the other." I&
121. 1d.

122. Id123. Id124. Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 385.
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on the pill. They capture by negative implication the more
complex relationship of polarity that Fuller is seeking to establish. If we are to come to meaningful terms with experience,
Fuller insists, we must leave behind a language of simplistic or
radical opposition and instead begin to think in terms of relationships that simultaneously involve both opposition and interdependency-relationships metaphorically embodied by the
magnet with two poles or by the battery with both a positive
and a negative charge. 125
Underlying Fuller's embrace of polarity is the effort to develop a jurisprudential perspective that embraces rather than
denies the complexities and contradictions of human experience. And the very heart of this effort, as the recurring imagery of Fuller's jurisprudence makes clear, is the fundamental
and civilizing impulse to achieve and express a balanced view.
VI.

DESIGN AND MEANING: POLARITY AS A
COMPOSITIONAL ETHIC IN FULLER'S
JURISPRUDENCE

One cannot appreciate the full impact of polarity upon
Fuller's jurisprudence, however, until one comes to see how it
shapes the structure and movement of his essays and, in doing
so, profoundly affects their underlying meaning. This touches
upon what in my view is the greatest shortcoming of the traditional theory-seeking approach to Fuller's jurisprudence: its
failure to take account of the way the meaning of Fuller's essays is influenced by their underlying imaginative design.
Under the traditional approach, almost no attention has been
paid to Fuller's essays as essays. The tendency, rather, has
been to treat Fuller's essays as the more-or-less accidental containers of his thought, as something to go rummaging about in
for stray evidences of his theoretical system. My purpose here
is to attempt to turn this around. It is to show how polarity
serves as an important compositional ethic in Fuller's jurisprudence and, more generally, to direct attention to the way the
structure and movement of Fuller's essays affects their ulti125. Another manifestation of the same art and impulse is Fuller's recourse, in describing the tendency of one jurisprudential school to overreact to
the errors of another, to the metaphorical image of a person rushing precipitously "to place his weight on the light side of a tipping boat." L. FULLER,
JURISPRUDENCE, suipra note 22, at 717. What is so appropriate, and so representative, about the use of this particular imagery is that while it calls attention to the imbalance created by the overreaction, it also recognizes how
altogether human it is to overreact in this way.
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mate meaning. By developing a better understanding of the internal operation of Fuller's essays as essays, I hope to show, one
can gain important insights into Fuller's larger jurisprudential
purposes.
Fuller's essays generally fall into the classic pattern of dialectic. This means that it is possible to discern within Fuller's
essays, often if not invariably, the three basic steps or phases of
dialectic: first, a statement of the conventional wisdom set
forth in an inherited language which often proceeds in terms of
simplistic or radical opposition; second, a refutation of the original way of thinking and talking about experience by exposing
its inadequacies; and third, an attempted reconstitution of the
original language in more integrated and stable terms. 2 6 The
underlying thrust of Fuller's essays is dialectic in that their
central aim is the permanent reconstitution of language along
such lines. Their purpose is to change the way we think and
talk about experience so as to enable us to view and comprehend the world around us in a more complex and integrated
light.
This dialectical purpose is reflected in what might be described as the characteristic movement of Fuller's essays. In
general, it is a movement from a disintegrative way of thinking
and talking about the world toward the discovery and development of a more integrative way of doing so. Often this is
accompanied by a parallel movement: from the unstable discourse of platitude and simplistic opposition toward the expression of more complex and stable truths. Readers of Johnson's
12 7
Rambler essays will recognize this pattern as a familiar one.
Indeed, as suggested elsewhere, 2 8 the experience offered by
Fuller's essays is very much like that offered by Johnson's
works. Moreover, Fuller's essays often turn upon a pivotal
movement-a critical movement of insight toward which polarity impels-when we suddenly come to see how things "apparently contradictory" in fact form "indispensable complements
for one another."
Let me illustrate by discussing three of Fuller's essays,
each of which offers a distinctive example of Fuller's character126. For a discussion of classic dialectic as it is performed by Plato in the

Gorgita, see J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 93-113. White condenses the three
steps into a refutation and a reconstitution phase. See id
127. For an insightful discussion of Johnson's essays, see J. WHITE, supra

note 69, at 141-53.
128. See supra text accompanying note 85 and text following note 85; infira
text accompanying notes 242-244.
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istic mode of dealing with experience. It is not insignificant
that each of these essays proceeds from an initial statement of
some fundamental opposition: in the first, it is between means
and ends; in the second, between the natural law and the positivist perspectives on legal experience; in the third, between a
world centered in the language of efficiency and one centered
in the language of distributive justice. Fuller's recurring effort
in these essays is to press through the barriers established by
these traditional oppositions or antinomies to discover and explore the world of complexity and difficulty that lies beyond.

A.

MEANS AND ENDs: TOWARD A MORE COMPLEX
APPRECIATION OF EXPERIENCE

Fuller begins his classic essay Means and Ends129 by placing in juxtaposition two statements of conventional wisdom regarding the relationship that exists between means and ends in
the context of social design. In the first of these statements,
Isaiah Berlin contends that if there is going to be disagreement
it is likely to be over the great ends of society, and that, once
these large ends have been agreed upon, the question of means
will take care of itself.1 30 In the second, Aldous Huxley takes
the exact opposite position, arguing that the great ends of society are really not that controversial, rather it is over the means
to be employed in their realization that substantial disagreement is likely to occur. 131 Each of these schools of thought,
Fuller observes, has its adherents. On the one hand, there are
the "absolutists" who "consider that until the question of ultimate values is resolved no meaningful judgment can be passed
on particular ways of ordering men's relations with one another."1 3 2 On the other hand, there are the "ethical skeptics,"
or "anarchists," who insist "that any judgment expressing a
preference for one state of affairs over another must be emotionally grounded and hence not properly a judgment at all."1 3 3
Fuller's own impulse is to seek a more complex middle
129. L. FuLLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24.
130. Id. at 53.
131. Id. at 52-53. In treating this essay, Summers completely misses the
characteristic juxtaposition of opposed views from which Fuller's essay proceeds, treating Fuller's effort as simply an effort to bring "means" up to a parity with "ends." R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 76. Taken by itself, this
oversight might seem insignificant, but it is another reflection of Summers's
failure to see the significance of polarity as a shaping force in Fuller's essays.
132. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 48.
133. Id.
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ground.13
In thinking about the relationship that exists between
means and ends in the context of social design, Fuller suggests,
we should approach our task much as an architect would do.135
We should begin by recognizing that our ultimate vision is
necessarily shaped by the limitations and possibilities of the
materials with which we have to work. Fuller rejects the view
that one can talk meaningfully about ends without at the same
time considering the limitations and possibilities of available
means. 136 But then in a characteristic move, Fuller cautions us
against the temptation of embracing the opposite extreme. The
opposite of a false or erroneous position, he points out, may also
be false. "[B]ecause it is a mistake to assign an unconditional
primacy to ends over means in thinking about creative human
effort," Fuller argues, "it does not follow that the mistake can
be corrected by a turn of a hundred and eighty degrees."'13 7 In
other words, it makes no sense to canvass exhaustively the
materials potentially available until we have some idea of an ultimate vision. The activity of social design is one that in the
end must necessarily proceed in terms of a complex reciprocal
movement involving "circles of interaction."' 38
134. By "middle position" or "middle way," Fuller did not intend some
mushyheaded middle position, uncritically attained, one that might be described as conveniently halfway between polar position A and opposite polar
position B. What he intended, rather, was pursuit of a much more difficult
and complex set of relationships. One way to express it is to say the middle
ground to Fuller is like the ground occupied by "courage" in relation to "foolhardiness" on the one hand and "timidity" on the other. It represents a mean
in the classic Greek sense. Indeed, Fuller's entire effort to carve out a "middle
way," to seek "affirmations of the middle range," see supra text accompanying
note 24, was modeled on Aristotle's ethical notion of "mean" in the
Nichomachean Ethics. See L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 31.
135. See L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 50.
136. See id at 50-51.
137. Id at 51-52. Fuller goes on: "[lIt does not follow that [a false or erroneous argument] can be corrected by reversing every assertion in it. Some
vague conception of architectural ends at the outset is essential to define the
range of means worthy of consideration for architectural purposes." Id at 52.
It should be noted that Fuller's approach to language and experience is very
similar to that which underlies Swift's performance in A Tale of a Tub, see J.
SwIFT, supra note 2; J. WHrITE, supra note 69, at 114-37. In both cases, the
heart of one's education lies in coming to see that the opposite of a false position is often also false.
138. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supranote 24, at 54. Fuller puts it in the
following Burkean terms:
[We must recognize] the plain fact that human aims and impulses do
not arrange themselves in a neat row of desired "end states." Instead
they move in circles of interaction.... We should not conceive of an
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Complicating our understanding of the nature of the undertaking still further, Fuller goes on to suggest that the limitations of the medium with which we must work are not,
properly viewed, simply negative constraints, but often, as in
music, an important source of creative inspiration. 139 "Some
limitation of means is essential," he argues, "to liberate the creative spirit."'140 The same holds true for "problems of social design," Fuller insists, where limitations of means must also be
regarded as "liberating limitations."'141 The remainder of his
essay is then devoted to exploring the implications of this paradoxical observation. 142
One can begin to see at this point what is meant when it is
said that the polarity ethic shapes the underlying structure and
movement-and meaning--of Fuller's essays. In this essay, for
example, we begin with the conventional and polarized understanding of the relationship between means and ends, a relationship expressed primarily in terms of radical subordination
of means to ends, or vice versa. The world in which we initially
find ourselves is one in which the "absolutist" argument (i.e.,
the real controversy is over ends not means) is pitched in simplistic opposition to the argument of the "ethical skeptics" (i.e.,
the real controversy is over means not ends). One side contends that it makes no sense to talk about means until we have
settled upon ends; the other counters that it makes no sense to
talk about ends in the abstract. We begin, in other words, with
a way of thinking and talking about experience that is simplistically or radically antithetical and, consequently, disintegrative
in tendency. In the course of Fuller's essay, however, we are
first brought to see the inadequacies of this language of simplistic opposition, and eventually forced to develop a more complex
language to describe the complex reality. We move, in essence,
from a world in which means are opposed to ends to one in
institution as a kind of conduit directing human energies toward some
single destination.... Instead we have to see an institution as an active thing, projecting itself into a field of interacting forces, reshaping
those forces in diverse ways and in varying degrees.
Id The question is not whether the institution serves certain prespecified
ends well. "Instead we have to ask a question at once more vague and more
complicated-something like this: Does this institution, in a context of other
institutions, create a pattern of living that is satisfying and worthy of man's
capacities?" Id at 55.

139. See id at 51-52.
140. Id. at 51.
141. Id. at 52.
142. See id at 52-64.
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which they coexist in a relationship of "circles of interac-

tion."'143 We have entered the world of polarity: a world in
which "notions apparently contradictory form indispensable
complements for one another."'1
What is most striking, and most characteristic, about the
basic structure and movement of Fuller's essay in this respect is
its integrative force-a force that derives from the way the essay moves us from a disintegrative mode of organizing language
and experience toward a more integrative one. This occurs at
many levels. It takes place most obviously at the level of explicit argument outlined above: in our movement from a world
in which means are pitted against ends to one in which the relationship between the two must be described in terms of "circles of interaction." But one can sense the integrative force at
work in other ways as well. It is present, for example, in the
way Fuller weaves in analogies from architecture and music
until in the end those activities appear together with the activities of law and social design as distinct but interrelated manifestations of a single creative human endeavor. And it is
present, more generally, in the way Fuller's essay proceeds
upon the language of ordinary experience rather than that of
abstract theory,145 forming in this way an indissoluble connection between the particular activities of law and social design
he is describing and the rest of experience as we know it.
The integrative force of Fuller's essay derives as well from
the essential integrity of the piece, from the sense one gets that
the same vision that informs the large pattern and movement
of the essay informs as well the composition of individual paragraph and sentence and phrase. For example, Fuller's caution
against assuming that a "mistake can be corrected by a turn of
a hundred and eighty degrees"'' 1 reflects and reinforces at the
level of individual statement the larger thrust of his essay,
143. I& at 54.
144. Fuller, Reason and Fiat, supra note 1, at 381.
145. Fuller's choice of the language of ordinary experience over the language of theory as the language in which he wished his jurisprudence to proceed was both self-conscious and explicit. As he once said, "there is indeed a
lot of tacit and subtle wisdom concealed in the interstices of everyday speech."
L. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 23, at 196. The task of the philosopher was not to develop a separate theoretically-disciplined language but
rather to improve upon language, in part by clarifying distinctions implicit in
ordinary language. Fuller saw his task, in other words, very much as Samuel
Johnson saw his. For a discussion of Johnson's approach to language, see J.

WHrrE, supra note 69, at 138-62.
146. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 52.
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which in essence is to help us keep from falling into the habit
of thinking and talking about experience in terms of simplistic
antitheses.
If we descend to the level of individual phrase, moreover,
we find the same basic impulse reflected. Consider for example
the internal operation of Fuller's phrase "liberating limitations."1 47 Implicit in this phrase is the rejection of an understanding of the word "limitations" that would place it in a
relationship of simplistic opposition to "freedom" or "creativity." Fuller's phrase invites us rather into a more complex
world, one in which constraints and limitations continue to operate in part in opposition to freedom and creativity, but at the
same time represent conditions that give freedom meaning and
make creativity possible. We have moved from a simple language of opposition and antithesis to a complex and difficult
'148
language of "combination.
The embrace of an ethic of combination is not unique to
this essay, moreover, but is a characteristic aspect of Fuller's jurisprudence more generally. We can see the same thing reflected, for example, in Fuller's view of the task of designing
and realizing a "good social order."'' 49 Not surprisingly, Fuller's
conception of what is involved in this difficult undertaking is
also a complex and integrative one. As he once said: "[W]e are
not interested merely in order-the order, say, of a concentration camp-but in an order that is just, fair, workable, effective,
and respectful of human dignity."' 5 0 This statement nicely captures the complex aspirations of Fuller's jurisprudence in so far
as design of a good social order is concerned-"complex" because to Fuller the establishment of a good social order involved more than simply lining things up harmoniously at the
level of theory, it meant bringing into workable combination
the disparate and often competing tendencies inherent in the
effort to achieve a social order that is at once "just" and "fair"
and "workable" and "effective" and "respectful of human dignity." What is required for such a task, once more, is not a language constructed out of simplistic or radical antitheses, but a
complex language of combination.
147. Id148. Fuller shares a great deal in common with Burke in this respect. See
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
149. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 48 (emphasis in
original).
150. Id- at 47 (emphasis added).
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REASON AND FIAT: THE "DEEPER" COHERENCE OF THE
COMMON LAW APPROACH

A second illustration of how the polarity impulse shapes
the essential design and meaning of Fuller's jurisprudence is
provided by his famous essay Reason and Fiatin Case Law.15'
Fuller opens this essay in characteristic fashion by observing
that in continental jurisprudence "the schism between the philosophers of natural law and the legal positivists has been deep
and largely unbridged for decades." 152 He starts out with one
of those troublesome oppositions that in his view contributes to
a disintegrated understanding of legal and cultural experience.
In this case, that opposition is represented by the "schism" that
exists in continental theory between the positive law approach
which holds that law is the expression of the will or command
of the sovereign without regard to its compatibility with customs or ethical codes, and the natural law approach which
takes the view that law is the reflection of eternal principles
which exist above and apart from whatever the state or the sovereign may choose to do.
To continental jurists, Fuller goes on to observe, "the failure of Anglo-American legal scholars to accept the implications" of this basic division of the jurisprudential world has
been a source of constant frustration and "perplexity.' 53 The
continental reaction for the most part, however, has been simply to write off this Anglo-American refusal to deal with what
theory seems to require as yet another manifestation of the
perverse English habit of "muddling through" or of its American counterpart of "pragmatism."'
To the mind trained in
continental theory, logic compels the embrace of either the natural law or the positivist view. One cannot-at least not
responsibly-seek to have it both ways.
We come at this point to a crucial moment in Fuller's jurisprudence. For what the continental approach stands for here is
not just another theoretical problem, but ratherthe problem of
theory itself. It is as if Fuller found his way suddenly blocked
by a great cyclone fence posted with a NO TRESPASSING
sign. It is a fence that stands for the limitations of rationalist
theory. On this side of the fence lies the territory of theory; on
the other, a largely unexplored world. It is clear that Fuller
151. Fuller, Reason and Fia supranote 1.
152. Id. at 391.
153. I&

154. Id
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can turn sharply to the right and pursue a path called positivist
theory, or sharply to the left to pursue the path of natural law
theory, but neither option strikes him as wholly satisfactory;
both seem limited and artificial. This is the predicament in
which Fuller finds himself, the predicament into which rationalist theory leads.
Appreciating what Fuller does next is of crucial importance to an understanding of his larger jurisprudence. Fuller
turns neither to the left nor to the right but walks straight
through the cyclone fence of rationalist theory into the strange
and forbidden world that lies beyond. Understanding how and
why he does so provides a critical insight into the nature of his
basic view of the jurisprudential enterprise.
Fuller begins by conceding that there is a coherence to the
continental approach that is lacking in the Anglo-American
one: the internal coherence of theory. But he then goes on to
wonder if the Anglo-American refusal to surrender completely
to rationalist theory may not in the end reflect a deeper kind of
coherence. He states: "Yet I think the stubborn refusal to take
either horn of this dilemma, the apparently illogical acceptance
of both branches of the antinomy, that has characterized Anglo-American thinking, represents a greater insight, and a better logic, than that which has produced such sharp divisions on
the Continent."' 55 Fuller then invokes a conception of the peculiarly English character of mind that comes very close to the
Keatsian notion of "negative capability." He quotes the following passage from a writer on scientific history-a crucial passage because it holds the key to escape from the limitations of
theory:
"[The] English tendency to hold simultaneously beliefs which, in
the knowledge of the time, seem incompatible, is a constant surprise
to continental minds. It probably arises from an instinctive apprehension among a political people that there is usually much to be said for
both sides of a question, and that further knowledge may reconcile
the seeming incompatibles. In abler minds it discloses a truly scientific power of following two lines of useful thought, while suspending
judgment on their deeper implications and correlations
for the exami1 56
nation of which there is not yet evidence available."

What the Anglo-American refusal to adhere strictly to rationalist theory represents, in other words, is not a vice-not ignorance nor superficiality nor inconsistency-but a very special
155. Id (emphasis added).
156. IHL (quoting W. DAMPIER-WHETHAM, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE 214
(1930)).
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kind of virtue. It reflects a deep cultural awareness that
"'there is usually much to be said for both sides of a question.' ",157 Unlike continental jurisprudence which adopts a
logically consistent but experientially false and ultimately disintegrative approach to legal experience, Fuller argues, the Anglo-American approach embodies at its heart "the spirit of give
and take,"'' 58 which is "one of civilization's most precious and
59
1
enduring gifts.'

There is an intimate connection, Fuller continues, between
the establishment of the "integrative" case law approach to
legal experience and the relative stability of the political culture of common-law countries. Continental jurisprudence is
based upon a radical division of labor between the role of "authority," represented by statutory law, and that of "reason,"
represented by the learned treatises. 160 In the Anglo-American
tradition, by contrast, these two roles or functions are combined
in the person of the creative common-law judge. 1 1 So, in this
sense as well, the Anglo-American approach to legal experience
is integrative in a way that the continental approach is not.
The integration of these functions in a single institutional
figure has "some causal connection," moreover, to the "relative
1 62
stability of political institutions in common-law countries.'
Fuller goes on to speculate that perhaps we are "a better political animal"' 6 3 because we do not depend entirely upon rationalist theory in the governance of our affairs. We are a problemsolving people.'6 The special genius of the common-law approach lies in its unique capacity for combining the "rational"
with the "practical." It is a genius, as Fuller puts it, for keeping
165
constantly in focus "the whole view.'
Notice how the structure and movement of this essay falls
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 394.
I&
See id- at 392.
See id
1&.

163. Id.
164. Id. at 392-94. The same view is expressed in Fuller, Williston, supra
note 16, at 14, where Fuller invokes with sympathy "Maine's observation that
the Greeks were too philosophic to be good lawyers, and that it took something of the practical and incurious temper of the Romans to build a great
legal system." Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). Fuller's basic argument is that too
much rationality and logic in a legal system can be destructive, and that it is
"all the little covert tolerances and inconsistencies which have made [ours] a
workable system in the past." Id.
165. Id. at 391.
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into a characteristic pattern. In this case, we move from the
disintegrative world of continental theory, a world characterized by "schisms" and "sharp division," into the integrative
world of the common law, with its unique capacity for taking
"the whole view." At the same time, and as part of the same
transition, we leave behind the brittle and unaccommodating
language of rationalist theory and, drawing upon the traditions
of the common law, gradually begin to develop a more complex
and difficult language of combination, a language, in this instance, that can better accommodate the competing demands of
the "rational" and the "practical." In the course of this essay,
our basic approach to legal experience is fundamentally transformed. When we emerge, we have left the world of rationalist
theory behind.
C. THE LANGUAGE OF EFFICIENCY AND THE LANGUAGE OF
DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE: FROM THE UNSTABLE
DISCOURSE OF PLATITUDE TOWARD THE
EXPRESSION OF MORE "STABLE" TRUTHS

A final illustration of the way polarity influences the shape
and meaning of Fuller's essays is found in his essay entitled
Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedom-A Review
of Robert L. Hale's "Freedom Through Law.'

66

Of the three

essays considered here, this is perhaps the most openly ideological in thrust. In it Fuller addresses the difficult, and, today,
still extremely divisive, question of how to think and talk about
freedom and efficiency and distributive justice in the modern
world. That is not the primary reason for including it here,
however. Rather, I include it because it serves to illustrate a
common and recurring pattern in Fuller's essays: the movement from an unstable discourse of platitude toward a language
capable of expressing more complex and stable truths.
Fuller begins this essay in characteristic fashion by setting
forth the opposition that exists in the popular mind between
the two primary languages used for talking about legal and economic freedom: the language of the market, which has as its
purported goal the pursuit of efficiency, and the language of
government planning and control, which has as its purported
goal the pursuit of distributive justice.1 67 The apparent antagonism that exists between these two languages, Fuller suggests,
represents a disintegrative force within the culture; thus, the
166.
167.

Fuller, Legal and Economic Freedoms,supra note 78.
Id. at 70-73.
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task is to see whether some sort of reconciliation can be worked
1 68

out.

The starting point is to recognize that freedom conceived
solely in terms of market language is often an illusory freedom-indeed, for many in the society, it may not be meaningful
freedom at all.169 In this respect, Fuller suggests, radical embrace of market language is both inadequate and deceptive.1 70
That does not mean that the opposite is true, however. Getting
rid of market language entirely and substituting in its place the
language of collective planning and control would not necessarily represent an improvement. Fuller is greatly critical of the
platitudinous sociology1 71 that posits a radical dichotomy between a world governed by the "blind and uncontrolled economic forces" 172 of the market on the one hand, and a world in
which these forces are replaced by "intelligent human direction
and planning" on the other hand. 7 3 Such a view is reflected,
for example, in the often repeated sentiment that "[t]o be truly
free man must liberate himself from the control of the market."17 4 The problem with this perspective, Fuller suggests, is
that it rests on an essentially schizophrenic view of the universe. It leads to the radical division of the universe into two
diametrically opposed spheres,175 and in this sense is disintegra168. Id. at 72-73.
169. "[What does it profit a man to be legally and politically free if he is
hungry and ill-clad so that he cannot enjoy his freedom? A man cannot be
truly free unless he is economically free, that is, unless he enjoys a certain
state of economic well-being." i. at 74.
170. Fuller rejects, for example, the language of maximization-in this
case, Robert Hale's statement that "whether [a] particular change will bring
about a net enlargement or a net diminution of individual liberty"-as a valid
language for testing the legitimacy or soundness of legislative policy. Id. at 71
(quoting R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW ix (1952)).
171. Fuller, Legal and Economic Freedoms,supra note 78, at 75 n.5.
172. Id. at 75.
173. I&
174. I&
175. See infira note 218. It should be noted that this particular way of organizing language and experience is not unique to the literature of Fuller's
day. A great deal of contemporary jurisprudential literature proceeds upon
uncritical embrace of the same sort of radical dichotomy: upon the claim, for
instance, that one must either radically embrace or radically reject the language of the market, see, e.g., Tushnet, Book Review, 78 MICH.L. REv. 694, 696
(1980) (The "central issue in political philosophy today" is "which socio-economic system, capitalism or socialism, justice demands"); or upon the division
of the universe into two radically opposed spheres: on the one side, efficiency,
on the other, justice; on the one side, slavery to the market, on the other,
meaningful freedom; on the one side, all that is evil and destructive, on the
other, the promise of salvation. For a classic example of this internally-di-
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tive in thrust.
It is at this point in Fuller's essay that the polarity impulse
comes into play, provoking a critical shift in perspective that
transforms what initially appears as an impasse created by two
radically-opposed views into an opening for further inquiry and
understanding. In this instance, Fuller finds his initial
purchase in Hale's provocative assertion that "[t]he law gives
sanction to economic inequalities and is therefore justified in
removing them." 176 Fuller is troubled by this assertion, but not
because he finds it somehow too radically egalitarian in thrust.
Indeed, Hale's conclusions do not disturb him.177 The problem
lies, rather, in putting things this way. It does so because in
Fuller's view, it "directs attention away from the thing that
most needs attention, namely, the modes, forms, and purposes
of legal and economic restraints."'178 What is "badly neglected"
by Hale, Fuller argues, is "the important truth that you cannot
intelligently discuss economic freedom in isolation from the
specific mechanisms or procedures by which that freedom is determined, or, as I should prefer to say, by which freedom to
choose is allocated and conflicting choices are reciprocally adjusted."'' 79 If we are going to work for a genuine reconstitution
of the legal and social order, one that will provide for meaningful participation by ordinary citizens in decisions that vitally affect their lives, 8 0 then the questions to be asked are those that
address
vided approach to the organization of language and experience, see M. HORwrrz, supra note 2. The schizophrenic character of Horwitz's critical mode is
discussed in Teachout, Boundaries of Realism, 67 VA. L. REv. 815, 819-20
(1981); Teachout, Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 241, 241-47, 272-78 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Teachout, Book Review].
176. Fuller, Legal and Economic Freedoms, supra note 78, at 80 (discussing
R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAw 3-37 (1952)); see also id. at 71 (Fuller concluding that Hale's thesis "amounts to saying that since the rich man could not

hold his own against the mob without the aid of the law, the law, having been

particeps criminis to an economic inequality, may properly salve its conscience by taking something from the rich and giving it to the poor").
177. See id. at 80.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 77. Fuller anticipates here Professor Paul Brest's recent call
for a "genuine reconstitution of society-perhaps one in which the concept of
freedom includes citizen participation in the community's public discourse and
responsibility to shape its values and structure." Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative Constitutional
Scholarship,90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981). Brest may have meant to exclude
from the scope of "citizen participation" the vital economic decisions that
Fuller lists here, but that seems unlikely.
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how the citizen can effectively participate in the following vital decisions: What shall be produced? How shall the goods that are produced be priced in relation to one another? What resources of society
shall be drawn into production and how shall they be organized and
allotted among the various productive enterprises? Who shall work
where and at what jobs?1 8 1

The crucial thing to note about this passage is the characterof
the language in which it proceeds. By shifting the perspective
slightly, as he has done, Fuller has carried us into a world
where the seeming opposition between considerations of efficiency and considerations of distributive justice has disappeared. Consider, for example, how the questions in this
passage elude simple characterization. In this context, clearly,
it would not be fair to say that they are just efficiency questions. But neither would it be accurate to insist that they are
concerned simply with distributive justice. Nor, to take a third
possibility, can they be fairly characterized as concerned solely
with participatory democracy. The fact is-and this is a measure of Fuller's achievement-these questions are centrally
concerned with all three. Fuller has carried us into a world
where the language of efficiency, the language of distributive
justice, and the language of participatory democracy have all
begun to merge into one.
It is in such an integrated language that Fuller continues.
It "is not a question," he argues, "of whether government
should concern itself with [the] problem [of distributive justice]"18 2-- such is and ought to be a central concern of any civilized order--"[r]ather it is where, how, by what procedures, and
with what objectives it should act.' 8 3 The important caution, if
experience is to be our guide, is that in acting, government
should "do one thing at a time and by methods appropriate to
the job at hand."'' 1 4 Fuller ends up, in other words, with a way
181.

Fuller, Legal and Economic Freedoms,supra note 78, at 77.

182. Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
183. Id
184. Id. at 81-82. This opens upon a major and important strand of Fuller's
jurisprudence which, because of space limitations, we cannot adequately de-

velop here. It has to do with Fuller's development of an understanding of the
interconnectedness of the various institutions within the overall legal process,
and with his sense that each has its own particular genius, that each is particularly equipped to do certain kinds of things in the overall division of labor.
Thus, Fuller would argue that we cannot simply eliminate, as a matter of principle or ideological conviction, the institution of contract or private ordering
without potentially overburdening some other institution. It is not just a question of what each institution is capable of doing, or of what each "principle is
capable of yielding," but, more important,
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of thinking and talking that combines the language of justice
with the language of efficiency, that proceeds upon simultaneous consideration of distributional ends and effective means. It
is a way of thinking and talking, significantly, that does not offer an easy solution to our problems, but opens upon real difficulties. Eliminating difficulties is not Fuller's effort, however;
rather, it is to establish the terms upon which further inquiryindeed, disagreement-can responsibly proceed.
This essay is representative of Fuller's jurisprudence in a
number of important respects. It is so, first, in the way it
moves us from a world in which the language of efficiency is
radically opposed to the language of distributional justice into
one where the two are brought to coexist in a more complex relationship of opposition and reciprocity. It is representative as
well in the way it moves from the language of platitude toward
the expression of more complex and stable truths. Nor should
it disappoint us that the truths toward which Fuller's essay
moves in this case take the form, not of assertions about what a
good social order should ultimately look like, but of questions
that serve at once to complicate our sense of the endeavor and
at the same time to keep things open. For the transformation
from platitudinous assertion to complicating question itself represents in this context a stabilizing and civilizing force. It is not
accidental in this respect but a reflection of the essential character of his larger jurisprudence that Fuller's essay should
"end" as it does: not by seeking to close off further conversation but by opening upon the shared endeavor of future inquiry. The important achievement is the development of a
critical language that will allow the inquiry to proceed in more
what strains its removal from a particular field of regulation would
throw upon the other principles [or institutions]. Thus, if a socialist
state takes as its goal destroying contract and the legitimated power
of ownership as the principal factors organizing the economy, we
must frankly face the task of describing what principles of order can
be substituted and whether they are capable of carrying the burden
that would be shifted to them.
L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 719.
Fuller's view of the interconnectedness of the institutions and principles
by which we order our affairs is intimately related to his appreciation of the
intricacy of the internal workings of the social and economic order. His view
is very similar to Burke's in this respect, especially in the shared sensitivity to
"the problem of absorbing reform." Fuller Letter, supra note 20, at 297.
These Burkean themes-first, the appreciation of the interconnectedness and
intricacy of the inherited order; and, second, the importance attached to proceeding by incremental adjustment rather than by radical change-form essential strands of Fuller's larger jurisprudential vision. See infra text
accompanying notes 225-226.
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complex and integrated terms, that will encourage consideration of the problem of freedom in the context of other important goals of a social order-distributive justice, efficiency,
democratic participation-and of the range of available means
for their combined realization. Fuller's achievement in this essay is representative in this sense of the achievement of his jurisprudence more generally. It is so in that what is performed
here is the development of complex language of combination
that allows and encourages us to take "the whole view."
D.

SUMMARY

It is important to keep in mind that these three essays are
representative only-they form but three individual strands of
a complex compositional web-and hence shed, at best, only
partial light on what eventually emerges in Fuller's jurisprudence as a deeply integrated vision of the world. Yet in their
underlying structure and movement they fairly reflect the
larger thrust of Fuller's jurisprudence: from the disintegrative
approach of continental (or rationalist) theory toward the more
integrative common-law approach; from the unstable language
of platitude toward a more complex and stable language of
combination; from a perspective grounded in phony oppositions
toward the development of a capacity for embracing "the whole
view." One should now be in a position to appreciate the kind
of integrative work that Fuller's essays do: the way that each
cuts through the underbrush of platitude, false antithesis, and
bad philosophy to let us see the world as it really is, and in doing so serves in some small measure to expand the frontiers of
our comprehension. It is through such a process that, cumulatively, Fuller's essays carry us into a new dimension of
understanding.
It should be possible by now, moreover, to see what is
meant when it is said that polarity provides the compositional
ethic that shapes both the structure and the meaning of
Fuller's essays. For if they do nothing else, these essays serve
to demonstrate how "notions apparently contradictory in fact
form indispensable complements for one another.' 1 85 They
represent in this sense performances of the art and discipline of
polarity: the art and discipline of making sense out of a complex reality, of reversing the centrifugal spin of disintegrative
185. Fuller, Reason and Fiat,supra note 1, at 381.
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ways of thinking and talking about experience, of putting
things back together.

VII.

THE SOUL OF THE FUGUE: THE ORGANIC UNITY
OF FULLER'S JURISPRUDENCE

fugue: ...

a contrapuntal musical composition in which one or two

melodic themes are repeated or imitated by the successively entering
voices and developed in a continuous
interweaving of voice parts into
1 86
a well-defined single structure.

The art of putting things back together finds its ultimate
expression in the deep integrity of Fuller's jurisprudential vision. Yet there is a difficulty in describing that integrity of vision in conventional terms because, whatever form it takes, it is
not the internal coherence of theory. What we encounter,
rather, is a coherence of a deeper and more complex sort-a
compositional integrity. It is the sort of thing that holds the
world of Burke's Reflections together, a complex interweaving
of theme and structure.18 7 However, the unifying pattern in
Fuller's jurisprudence is a distinctive one.
One way to talk about the unity of Fuller's jurisprudence is
to turn to the perspective of literary criticism and to observe
that what is most distinctive -about relationships in Fuller's
world is their underlying dramatic quality. Fuller's world is
clearly a dramatic rather than a utopian one, and once one is
alerted to this fact it is possible to see the essentially dramatic
character of relationships at every point and level. It is perhaps
most obvious at the level of large cultural vision. Unlike utopian jurisprudence, Fuller's jurisprudence does not hold out the
prospect of a future world in which one day all our conflicts
will be over, and, bound together by some wonderful harmony
of purpose, we will be able to live happily ever after.1'8 In
Fuller's world, rather, our future existence, at least in essential
character, will not be radically different from that which we
have always known. It will still be a world composed at its core
of tensions and contradictions and complexities.
That is not to say Fuller does not hold out the vision of a
world in important respects more decent and just than our
own, because he does. Indeed, his central effort lies precisely
186. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 918 (1971).
187. For a discussion of the role of compositional integrity in Burke's Reflections, see J. WHrrE, supra note 69, at 192-230.
188. Radical communitarian literature embraces this sort of utopian vision.
See Teachout, Book Review, supra note 175, at 275 n.118.
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here: it is to help establish the conditions that will make the
realization of such a world more possible. What it does mean,
rather, is that, unlike utopian jurisprudence which embraces
the vision of a future world radically different-and in this respect cut off and apart-from the one we know, Fuller advances a vision in which present experience is essentially
continuous with future experience. And what provides the
critical element of continuity is the permanently "dramatic"
character of human experience.
Fuller views the tensions and contradictions and complexities of experience as we know it, in short, as an inescapable
condition of human existence. More than that: he views such
tensions as forming the very heart of human experience. We
should regard them not as a negative or destructive force, he
insists, but rather as a positive source of energy and growth and
life. 8 9 This basic idea not only shapes the large cultural vision
to which Fuller gives expression in his jurisprudence, but informs his underlying approach to experience at every possible
level. In doing so, it provides a powerful unifying force in his
jurisprudence.
Fuller's embrace of polarity, it should be apparent, is a
reflection of this same dramatic ethic since the complex relationship of opposition and interdependency that the polarity
impulse embodies is itself an internally dramatic one. Polarity
introduces, however, an added and complicating dimension.
For although it embraces the dramatic character of experience,
it also, simultaneously, exerts a constant pressure toward
achievement of some form of reconciliation of the dramatically
opposed elements. Polarity embodies within itself, in other
words, both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies, both the
189. See infra text accompanying notes 219-221. In stressing the dramatic
character of Fuller's jurisprudence, and in opposing the "dramatic" to the

"utopian," it is important not to be carried too far in that direction. Although
Fuller clearly adopted the view that the tensions and contradictions within a

culture serve as a positive source of energy and life, his position was not that
of a sentimentalist or romantic anarchist. Indeed, Fuller was quite critical of
Jerome Frank's posturing in this regard. He takes Frank to task for his silly
raptures about how an "enlightened and normal person takes a 'positive delight in the hazardous, incalculable character of life,' and regards 'life's very

insecurity' as its 'most inviting aspect"' for "the person free from psychic repression." Fuller, Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 433 (quoting J. FRANK, LAW

AND THE MODERN MIND 17 (1930)). The attraction of the dramatic model to
Fuller lay not just in its capacity for embracing those tensions and contradic-

tions that form the life of the mind and of the larger culture, but in its ability
to do so in a way that led toward a more complex and stable appreciation of
the underlying relationships.
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forces of opposition
and those of integration and
interdependency.
The analogy to dramatic literature is helpful as far as it
goes, but, as the discussion of polarity suggests, it does not go
far enough. To discover the unifying pattern underlying
Fuller's jurisprudence, one must finally turn to the even more
complex patterns of music. The most attractive analogy here is
to the classical fugue, for in the basic patterns of the fugue one
finds embodied the two most prominent features of Fuller's jurisprudence: the dramatic organization of experience and the
constant movement toward the establishment of an integrated
perspective. Indeed one could do far worse in looking for a description of the underlying architecture of Fuller's jurisprudence than to turn to the traditional "definition of the fugue:
"[a] contrapuntal musical composition" in which one or more
themes are "repeated or imitated" in a wide variety of forms
and contexts, and "developed in a continuous interweaving ...
into a well-defined single structure."' 19°
The analogy is not a perfect one of course; among other
things, it fails to express adequately the powerful ethical aspirations of Fuller's jurisprudence. 91 But consider how perfectly
in other respects this definition captures the essence of the underlying pattern of Fuller's jurisprudence. It does so in part because, like the classical fugue, Fuller's jurisprudence proceeds
centrally upon the "contrapuntal" or dramatic organization of
experience. But even more helpful is the way in which the
fugue analogy captures the characteristic mode of Fuller's jurisprudence: the way it builds upon itself through a process of
repetition or imitation of a dominant theme (here the polarity
theme) in a wide range of contexts. There could be no better
description of how Fuller's jurisprudence moves toward a single
unified vision of experience than in the description of how, in
the classical fugue, certain recurring themes are developed
through a process of "continuous interweaving" into "a well-defined single structure."
So it is in Fuller's world that relationships are not static,
they do not remain suspended in a state of tension or opposition
but rather constantly undergo active transformation. The dramatic oppositions are there to be sure, and they form a central
and continuing aspect of our experience. But it is as if upon entering the world of Fuller's essays, those oppositions enter into
190.
191.

See supra note 186 and accompanying tbxt.
See infra text accompanying notes 227-233.
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an active field of force-as if they are caught up in a
countermovement which propels them constantly toward a
form of complex reconciliation, toward a single integrated vision. In its internally complex underlying patterns, in other
words, the classical fugue offers a remarkably simple and accessible model for the complex patterns of opposition and integration which give shape and meaning to Fuller's jurisprudence.
It is important to stress in this respect that what is involved is not simply structure. In Fuller's world, it will be recalled, structure and substantive vision-form and substanceare not separate and isolated entities but inextricably interconnected. 192 "Though we are under the necessity of opposing
them to one another," Fuller would say, "we must recognize
that each implies the other. '193 So it is here that the fugue-like
structure of Fuller's jurisprudence "implies" a substantive vision of experience. The contrapuntal structure of Fuller's jurisprudence carries with it, for example, a centrally-shaping
substantive contrapuntal or dramatic ethic. In a similar fashion, the dominant structural activity in Fuller's jurisprudencethe "continuous interweaving . . . into a well-defined single
structure"-reflects a substantive commitment to the development of a single integrated view of the world. In other words,
the fugue-like structure of Fuller's jurisprudence has its own
"inner morality,"'1 94 its own "soul." It is the reflection "in
structural terms"'195 of a deeply-held substantive ethic. It is in
this sense, it can be said, that one finds at the very heart of
Fuller's jurisprudence the soul of the classical fugue.
The purpose of the discussion that follows is to demonstrate the underlying unity of Fuller's universe. My effort is to
show how relationships of every type and at every level are
governed by the same fundamental vision of experience. It
does not matter whether one is talking about the contract relationship, or the internal psychological makeup of the individual, or the adversary process, or the larger social order, or the
192. See supra text accompanying note 77.
193. Fuller, Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 452. Fuller employed this descriptive sentence in the context of his discussion of the opposition between

law and society, but the underlying relationship-the polarity relationshipcuts across every sector of experience in Fuller's world. See supratext accompanying notes 104-125.
194. The reference is to Fuller's highly original and illuminating notion of
"the inner morality of law," which is developed in L. FULLER, MORALrrY OF

LAW, supra note 23, at 33-94. See infra note 216.
195. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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pursuit of truth. In Fuller's universe these all proceed, as
'196
Burke would say, "in the same course and order.

A.

THE DRAMATIC OR CONTRAPUNTAL ETHIC AS A
SOURCE OF UNITY

There is no better place to begin than with an understanding of Fuller's conception of the contract or exchange relationship. The contract relationship is particularly significant in
Fuller's jurisprudence for two reasons: it represents human encounter and engagement at the most atomistic level of social
and economic interaction; and it plays a central role in Fuller's
view of the optimal functioning of the social and economic order. Indeed, there is a sense in which it can be said the contract
relationship provides a paradigm for relationships at every
other level in Fuller's universe.
Because he places such importance upon the contract relationship in his jurisprudence, one might be tempted to typecast
Fuller as simply another doctrinaire contractarian, or to dismiss
him out-of-hand as yet another exponent of traditional market
ideology. Before doing so, however, it is important to take a
closer look at what Fuller's view of the essence of the contract
relationship actually is. It is not, significantly, a relationship ultimately expressed, or even expressible, in the language of market ideology. What Fuller turns to, rather, when he wants to
talk about the essence of the contract relationship is the language of polarity.
Consider in this light Fuller's description of the conditions
under which "explicit bargaining" can be expected to operate
most effectively: "Explicit bargaining involves, then, an uneasy
blend of collaborationand resistance. This explains why it does
not fit readily into either extreme of the spectrum of human
relationships running from intimacy to open hostility."' 9 7 In
Fuller's view, significantly, the exchange relationship requires
for its optimal functioning that same general capacity of mind
and character that Keats was aiming at when he invoked the
idea of "negative capability": the capacity for working and living in a world of unresolved tension between the tugs and pulls
of competing tendencies. The internally dramatic quality of ex196. E. BURKE, supra note 54, at 38.
197. L. FULLER, The Role of Contract in the Ordering Process of Society
Generally,in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L.

FULLER 169, 185 (K. Winston ed. 1981) (emphasis added) [hereainfter cited as
L. FULLER, Role of Contract].
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perience in Fuller's world is perfectly captured by his description here of the bargaining or contract relationship as "an
198
uneasy blend of collaboration and resistance."'
This conception of the basic exchange relationship leads
Fuller to make one of those wonderfully illuminating insights
into human nature that we encounter again and again in his jurisprudence, in this instance into the fundamental nature of the
Marxian sensibility. Although Fuller's observation is aimed
specifically at Marx's own curious antipathy to the exchange
relationship, it also has clear application to those others who
find themselves drawn to the Marxian view. It was, Fuller suggests, Marx's psychological aversion to the bargaining relationship that led him ultimately to divide the world as he did into
198. Fuller's world is not one in which those who engage in the activity of
contract are perceived as narrowly pursuing selfish needs or arbitrary desires
in utter disregard of the welfare of the larger community. His is not a world
governed by either a radical utilitarianism or a narrow instrumentalism.
Rather, Fuller's conception of the contract relationship and its place in the
larger culture requires recognition of the bargaining individuals as at once
competitive and communal beings, as simultaneously pursuing self-interest
and enhancement of the larger community. Characteristically, Fuller refused
to adopt a view of the world which would place the pursuit of self-interest in a
position of simplistic opposition to the pursuit of communal interest. Rather
he insisted, with Philip Wicksteed, that there is nothing inherently ignoble or,
for that matter, inherently disintegrative in the pursuit of self-interest:
There is surely nothing degrading or revolting to our higher sense in
this fact of our mutually furthering each other's purposes because we
are interested in our own ....The economic nexus [that is, the nexus
of exchange] indefinitely expands our freedom of combination and
movement; for it enables us to form one set of groups linked by community of purpose, without having to find the "double coincidence"
which would otherwise be necessary.
Id. at 186 (quoting 1 P. WICKSTEED, THE COMMON SENSE OF POLITICAL PHILOSoPHY 156, 179-80 (1933)). To Fuller the primary attraction of the exchange relationship was that it provided automatically, without cumbersome state
intervention, the "double coincidence" of advancing self-interest at the same
time it advanced a shared community of purpose. Cf L. FULLER, Practicing
Lawyer, supra note 79, at 290 ("[T]he zeal of advocacy is one of those tricks of
nature by which a man is lured into serving the public interest without knowing it .... ).
Fuller had no romantic or sentimental illusions about contract; he was
deeply concerned with problems of distributional justice, see supra text accompanying notes 166-175, and keenly aware of the shortcomings of a social order
based exclusively in a regime of contract. Yet, if he was aware of the limitations of contract, he was also aware of its possibilities. The reason that contract plays such a central role in Fuller's vision of the social order is not
because of a romantic attachment to contract itself. Rather it derives from the
belief that contract in the context of other established institutions provided a
mechanism for dealing with the complex problems of autonomy, freedom,
democratic participation, and distributional justice better than had any other
institutional arrangement. See Fuller Letter, supra note 20, at 297.
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two radically opposed spheres, one centered in community and
concerned with things political, the other centered in the self
and concerned with the activity of exchange. 199 It was, in other
words, Marx's lack of "negative capability"--his psychological
inability to function in a world that required acceptance of a
complex relationship of "collaboration and resistance"--that
led him to embark upon this divisive course.200 Nor is it entirely inconceivable that scholars who find themselves attracted
to Marx's teachings also suffer to a greater or lesser extent
from the same aversion or inability. Indeed, this may account
in large part for the disintegrative organization of language and
20 1
experience we encounter in their writings.
It is in this special sense then-as the embodiment of a
complex reciprocal relationship of "collaboration and resistance"-that contract can be said to serve as a paradigm for
other critical relationships in Fuller's world. When we turn
from Fuller's view of contract to his view of the internal
makeup of the individual mind and psyche, we can see the
same essentially dramatic ethic at work. It manifests itself particularly in the central recognition Fuller gives to the role of
"unresolved conflict" 20 2 and "unresolved state of tension" 20 3 in
our thinking and psychological makeup. To Fuller, it is clear,
199. Fuller observes:
Karl Marx expressed in his writings a deep aversion for relations of
explicit exchange . .. in the youthful "alienation theme." In 1843
Marx wrote of a man as leading a double life; "a life in the political
community in which he recognizes himself as a communal being, and
a life in bourgeois society [that is, in a trading society] where he acts
as a private person, who regards others as means, reduces himself to
the level of a means and becomes the plaything of alien forces."
L. FULLER, Role of Contrac4 supra note 197, at 185-86 (quoting R. TUCKER,
PHILOSOPHY AND MYTH IN KARL MARx 105 (1961)) (emphasis in original).
200. See i&i
201. Notice for example how the world of Horwitz's historiography constantly tends toward radical disintegration: with efficiency increasingly pitted
against justice, law against morality, and the individual against the communal
self. It is a world that resolves itself finally into a schizophrenic division between two polarized constellations of values. M. HoRWrrz, supra note 2; see
Teachout, Book Review, supra note 175, at 242 n.4.
202. Fuller says:
[It is better to accept frankly a state of unresolved conflict or tension
in our reasoning than to purchase consistency at the cost of needed
premises, for it is, after all, scarcely to the credit of legal philosophy
that it achieves harmony within its domain if this is accomplished
only by barring its frontiers to every vital and fruitful idea that might
disturb the internal order.
Fuller, Reason and Fia supra note 1, at 377.
203. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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such unresolved tensions and conflicts constitute, in a very real
sense, the life of the mind and the self.
It is such a view of human nature that leads Fuller to reject the "mechanical behaviorism" that informed, as he saw it,
the writings of the legal realists, and in particular those of Underhill Moore. 20 4 One important consequence is that in Fuller's
jurisprudence we do not find the kind of caricature-producing
condescension that we find in the writings of those realist
scholars who, for whatever reason, seek to create an unenlightened, often sinister, "them"-bankers, businessmen, lawyers,
judges, traditional law professors, elitist professionals, and
other establishment figures-to set off against an embattled
and enlightened "us.

' 20 5

In Fuller's world, rather, all individu-

als, even lowly bank tellers, 206 are complex ethical beings, in
essential motivation no different from the rest of us. Whatever
their office or station, they are internally complex creatures
whose experience is in large part characterized, as is ours, by
'207
dramatic "choice.
The same dramatic or contrapuntal ethic is reflected in
Fuller's view of the essential character of human associations.
Underlying almost all forms of human association, Fuller maintains, is an internal tension between two fundamental principles: "the legal principle" and "the principle of shared
commitment." 20 8 This is true whether one is talking about the
associations we form as children out on the playground, or
about the associations we form later in life at the local level, or
204. See supra note 94; infra note 206.

205. This attitude is not infrequently expressed in Critical Legal Studies
literature. See Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 249 (1984).
206. Fuller was especially critical of Underhill Moore on this point.
Moore's bank tellers, he observed, "remain mere habit complexes." Fuller,
Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 457 n.69. In order to develop law truly responsive to reality, Fuller insisted, one must leave behind the kind of mechanical
behaviorism that informs Moore's jurisprudence, and recognize that a bankteller is motivated by the same forces that motivate the rest of us-including
"his own imperfect notions of the law." I& at 458. Similarly, other economic
actors in Fuller's world are viewed as motivated by a "common emotional and
intellectual source-for example, (by] current conceptions of business expediency and social justice." I&. (emphasis added). It is instructive in this respect
to compare Fuller's sympathy-expanding view of bank tellers with the condescending view reflected in Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 28-29 (1984).
207. See infra text accompanying notes 219-221.
208. L. FULLER, Two Principlesof Human Association, in THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 67, 75 (K. Winston ed.

1981).
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about those that lie at the basis of social and institutional organization at the largest possible scale. The critical feature in
each instance is the relationshipthat is established between the
two principles. In any vital and stable form of association,
Fuller insists, the two principles must necessarily coexist in a
kind of perpetual tension. Fuller's description is a significant
one: the relationship is one neither of simple opposition nor of
perfect harmony; rather the two principles "fight and reinforce
' 20 9
each other at the same time.
The "latent tensions and hidden antinomies between the
two principles of judgment, '2 10 according to Fuller, form a
continuing and inescapable condition of human existence. The
reconciliation of these two principles under particular circumstances, always tentative and requiring constant adjustment, is the essential task of wise governance. Indeed the art
and challenge of government to a large extent lies in discovering which combination of the two principles is most appropriate
for which particular human activities and relationships. The
tension between the two principles, however, comes with the
territory. It is the tensions and contradictions within any form
of human association that ultimately serve to keep it from stagnating, that make it constantly possible to seek out and estab'211
lish "a richer bond of union."
A similar perspective informs Fuller's treatment of the
large question of what is involved in the pursuit of truth. It is
an endeavor, as Fuller sees it, that requires the reconciliation of
the competing tendencies of two great cultural traditions. The
Western tradition places great emphasis upon rationality and
"syllogistic reasoning."2' 12 The Eastern tradition, by contrast,
stresses "intuition that comes from study and virtuous living."2 13 But, as Fuller characteristically insists, "the whole
truth can only be recovered by combining the teaching of both
209. Id. at 73. Radical embrace of either principle to the exclusion of the
other would lead, Fuller suggests, to a kind of instability. He expresses deep
concern with what he perceives to be a tendency in our society toward excessive reliance upon the "legal principle"-for example upon "due process" and
"rules of duty and entitlement" in areas of human association in which legalization of the underlying relationships could have destructive side-effects. Id
at 79. But radical embrace of the alternative principle, the principle of shared
commitment, he stresses, could also have serious destabilizing consequences.
Id. at 76-77.
210. Id. at 82.
211. Id. at 85.
212. Fuller, Reason and Fia, supra note 1, at 390.
213. Id.
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'214

And so it goes: wherever we enter Fuller's jurisprudence,
and from whatever direction, we find the same basic impulse or
activity reflected-the same essentially poetic "reconciliation of
opposite or discordant qualities. 2 1 5 It is just such a reconciliatory undertaking, for example, that leads Fuller to discover in
the interstices between law and morality his highly original notion of the "inner morality" of the law.2 1 6 The same impulse
lies behind Fuller's effort to establish an entirely new field of
"eunomics" devoted to the study of "good order and workable
social arrangements. 2 1 7 For at bottom what that effort reflects
is the imaginative exploration of the territory where form and
substance meet. And we can see the same pattern reflected in
the complex bond that Fuller forges in his jurisprudence be214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. 2 S. COLERIDGE, supra note 111, at 12.
216. L. FULLER, MORAL=TY OF LAW, supra note 23, at 41-44. Fuller's notion
of "the inner morality of law" can best be understood as a third-phase expedition in a more general exploration of the interdependencies of law and morality. The first phase addresses the ways in which law incorporates and
implements the "external" substantive moral code or vision of a particular culture. The second involves recognition of how the procedures employed by the
culture in realizing specifically defined social ends reflect and shape in fundamental ways the ethical character of that culture. The emphasis we give in
our own culture to procedural due process and notions of fair play is a reflection of the recognition of the interconnectedness of procedure and substantive
morality in this respect. As Fuller once put it, "If we do things the right way,
we are likely to do the right thing." Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL EDUc. 189, 204 (1948).
Fuller's notion of the "inner morality of law" represents an effort to carry
this exploration into the interdependencies of law and morality a step further.
Quite apart from the substantive content of rules of law, and quite apart from
procedures made available for their implementation, there are other factors,
Fuller insists, that influence the claim any particular law might make for our
respect. Those factors-preconditions to our willingness to respect a particular
law as law-are elements of what Fuller calls "the inner morality of law." For
example, the law should take the form of a rule of general application; it
should be publicly pronounced so that those affected would have fair notice of
it; it should apply prospectively; it should be framed in clear and intelligible
language, and be free of internal contradictions;it should be consistently adhered to and administered, and done so in a way that is not inconsistent with
the languageof the law as actually formulated. L. FULLER, MORAL=T OF LAw,
supra note 23, at 33-94. It is important to note how this basic notion of the
"inner morality of law" is the product of an exploration into the interdependencies of law and morality--and, more generally, of form and substancethat is in a sense compelled, or at least inspired, by Fuller's embrace of
polarity.
217. L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra note 24, at 48. For a helpful brief
discussion of Fuller's notion of "eunomics," see Winston, Book Review, 95
ETHics 751, 753-54 (1985).
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tween the language of fact and the language of value, between
the language of "what is" and the language of "what ought to
be." 218 In each case, the essence of the underlying activity lies
in venturing beyond a world of simple opposition into that rich
and complex and difficult alternative world, the world of polarity, where things that once seemed opposed are shown to be in
fact also vitally dependent upon one another.

B. THE ORGANIC PREMISE
All of this ultimately leads to the expression of a great organic vision of the social and natural universe. That vision is
expressed in part in the following passage:
It is often assumed that the existence of tensions, contradictions and
competing principles of order within a society is a sign of impending
dissolution and death. We assert, on the contrary, that the absence of
these tensions, contradictions, and competing principles is one of the
surest symptoms that a society is dying.
The living organism of any animal is itself a bundle of tensions
and "contradictions." . . . One impulse pushes toward self-assertion
and exposure to new experiences, a contradictory impulse pushes toward escape and the lost security of the "intrauterine darkness." The
218. Against what he perceived to be the disintegrative approach of the
positivists, an approach based upon radical separation of the language of "is"
from the language of "ought," Fuller threw the entire weight of his jurisprudence. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103. His effort principally took
the form of developing a jurisprudential language in which value and being
could be viewed as forming aspects of an "integral reality." It was critically
important to Fuller in this respect that the language of jurisprudence be not
something separate and apart from, but continuous with, ordinary discourse,
see supra note 145, that it be a language infused with the "sentiments and attitudes" that make us human. See Fuller, Legal Realis, supra note 6, at 457
n.69.
The primary challenge lay in developing a language of adequate complexity: a language capable of recognizing "the fact of soul"-the fact of human
spirit and ideals-and "the soul of fact," see B. W=,
NnETEENTH CENTURY
STUDIES 25 (1949) ("The business of the Imagination [is] not to generate chimeras and fictions-the imaginary-but to 'disimprison the soul of fact.' "), while
at the same time preserving legitimate and helpful distinctions between the
fact and value. Here, again, the polarity impulse came to the rescue, for, by
holding out the model of a complex relationship of opposition and interdependency, it gave definition to the underlying task. This ultimately led Fuller to
develop a jurisprudential language capable of recognizing the differences between "what is" and "what ought to be," see, e.g., Fuller, Legal Realism, supra
note 6, at 461 ("Life resists our attempts to subject it to rules; the muddy flow
of Being sweeps contemptuously over the barriers of our Ought."), while at
the same time capable of recognizing the critical interdependence of the two,
see, e.g., Fuller, Williston, supra note 16, at 15 ("In [the] study of forces which
operate across time, the illusory present instant will tend to disappear, and
with it, the law that merely is") (emphasis added). For additional discussion of
Fuller's effort on this score, see Winston, supra note 44, at 5-6.
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two impulses balance one another and a complete triumph of either
would mean the destruction or disintegration of the organism
itself.2 1 9

In much the same way, a vital and stable culture depends for
its continued life and growth upon "a dynamic tension of opposing forces." 220 Fuller goes on:
This means that men must expect to be faced constantly with the necessity for choosing, for particular sectors of the economy or the body
politic, among competing principles of order. The inevitable result is
an appearance of "conflict" and "tensions."
To wish an end to these "conflicts" and "tensions" is to wish that
society should cease to grow, that the wants of its members should remain static, that the total physical, mental and moral environment in
which it lives should become stagnant. Choosing is a part of life
221
whether it be the life of an individual or a nation.

If polarity is the art of taking things apparently contradictory
and forging out of them an "integral reality," then this passage
is an expression of the polarity impulse in its most ambitious
and expansive form. Everything comes together here: the affirmation of the view that the tensions and contradictions of experience are not something to be shunned but a positive source
of energy and life; the central recognition of the dramatic character of experience at every level of existence; the establishment of crucial linkages connecting our lower with our higher
natures, our individual with our collective selves;2 22 and the
central emphasis upon growth and choice, upon the capacity of
both individuals and nations for self-renewal.
It is important to appreciate that the vision that Fuller embraces here is an organic one, that is, it is a vision that stresses
the parallels that exist between the social order and the natural
universe. In both worlds, tensions and internal contradictions
and complexities represent an inescapable condition of existence. Moreover, in both worlds, the presence of such tensions
and contradictions is clearly essential to the continued vitality
and stability of the larger order.
But there is another parallel as well, and that has to do
with the process by which the social order grows and develops.
Fuller's vision in this respect is much like Burke's great organic
219. L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 717.
220. Id
221. Id. at 718.
222. Notice how in this passage Fuller links the experience of "the living
organism of any animal" with the experience of the "individual" self with in
turn the experience and life of a "nation."
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vision of English constitutionalism in the Reflections, 2 2 particularly in the emphasis that is placed on the cultural capacity
for self-renewal. Fuller makes explicit the connection to
Burke's organic view of the social order in the following passage in which he is discussing "the problem of absorbing
reform.,"224
I think of society as an organism which can absorb and survive only so
much surgery. I find congenial many parts of the philosophy of
Burke, which conceives society to be founded on institutions and conventions which are not wholly rational and which conceives of progress as a gradual improvement of those institutions and conventions
in the direction of greater rationality. This view emphasizes that our
present state of society, however imperfect, represents an acquisition,
an encroachment of reason on chaos .... 225

In Fuller's world as in Burke's, the process by which civilization renews itself-by which our cultural heritage is preserved,
transmitted, and improved-is one by which, through countless
encounters with experience, the oppositions and tensions that
exist at any particular moment in time are transformed into
complex and more stable relationships of opposition and interdependency, and even as these "settle out" to a greater or
lesser extent, they are endlessly replaced with new oppositions
and tensions, preserving in this way the essentially dramatic
character of human experience; and so, to borrow from Burke,
"the whole, at one time, is never old or middle-aged or young,
but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on
through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation,
and progression. '22 6 And the moving force in all this-which is
the source of energy that at once unsettles the established
order and at the same time constantly propels it toward reconstitution in improved terms-is the fundamental human aspiration for a more just and coherent world.
The process of self-renewal that Fuller envisions here is
not one of radical departures and erratic shifts, but rather one
which involves the continuous reconstitution of language, self,
and culture. Its essence is not arrogant revolution but, as
Fuller says so nicely, the gradual "encroachment of reason
[upon] chaos."
223.
224.
225.
226.

E. BURKE, supra note 54, at 18-39.
Fuller Letter, supra note 20, at 297 (original emphasis altered).
Id at 297-98.
E. BURKE, supra note 54, at 38.
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C. ESTABLISHING A LANGUAGE OF ETHICAL ASPIRATION
Fuller's organic view of the cultural order is based, as suggested above, on the idea that the propelling factor in advance
of civilization is the irrepressible human aspiration for a more
just and coherent social order. What remains to be considered
is how Fuller took this idea and embodied it in the very texture
of the language in which his jurisprudence proceeds. Fuller's
jurisprudence is not a coldly scientific jurisprudence but a jurisprudence of human aspiration, of "soul. ''227 But where is it that

the soul resides, and how is it expressed?
The place to begin is by observing that in Fuller's jurisprudence we do not encounter the kind of schizophrenic voice that
tends to characterize realist writing- the voice that talks in a
negative, cynical, distrustful way about the world that "is" (a
world of oppression, exploitation, and alienation) and in a romantic, almost sentimental, way about the world that one day
"will be" (a world of solidarity, community, and love). The
voice we encounter in Fuller's essays, rather, is a fully integrated one. It is a voice-an attitude, a perspective-that combines a realistic appreciation of our shortcomings with what can
only be described as a self-conscious emphasis upon our possibilities. Fuller was keenly aware that terms of description are
not simply terms of description, that they have subtle but important consequences for the way we regard and conduct ourselves. He realized that the words we use to describe ourselves
not only reflect but also powerfully shape character. His great
effort, accordingly, is to infuse the language of "is" with ethical
aspiration. It is to develop a way of thinking and talking about
experience that would incline us toward realization of our better selves.
That explains, at least in part, why we do not find in
Fuller's jurisprudence the kind of self-deprecating view of lawyers, judges, and the activity of law that we so often encounter
in the writings of the legal realists. What we find instead is the
imaginative elaboration-the conscious holding out before usof our possibilities. Consider, for instance, Fuller's view of the
nature of the adversarial relationship, a relationship which lies
at the very heart of our legal system. We are all familiar with
the criticisms of the adversary system, with the complaints
about how it pits one against another and tears away internally
at the communal fabric. In some respects, Fuller fully admits,
227. See supra note 218; infra text accompanying notes 228-237.
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these complaints have a basis; thus in designing an overall system for dispute resolution, the negative aspects of the adversarial relationship must always be kept in mind. We should not
focus exclusively however on the negative side of the adversary
process, he insists, but consider as well the underlying possibilities. What is ultimately determinative is not the adversarial encounter itself but the relationshipwe establish with it.
Properly understood, advocacy of the sort our system depends upon involves something more than "mere persuasion, '228 something other than "a facile manipulation of legal
doctrine. ' 229 The spirit in which advocacy should be approached, rather, is that of seeking to assist a decisionmaker in
arriving at "a full understanding" 23 0 of an often complex reality. It should be regarded as part of a shared effort to ensure
the judicial decisionmaker arrives at a fully informed and responsible decision. Here again, the polarity impulse is at work:
in this case transforming what is often uncritically conceived in
terms of simple and disintegrative opposition into a complex relationship of adversariness and shared endeavor.
It is for much the same reason that we do not find in
Fuller's jurisprudence the distrustful and suspicious view of the
judicial figure that tends to characterize realist literature, with
the important consequence that we do not encounter in Fuller's
writings that same debilitating preoccupation with controlling
the judge's each and every move. 23 ' The key difference is that
in Fuller's jurisprudence the judge is regarded not as one of
"them" but as one of "us"-as someone who is motivated in
large part by the same complex ethical and practical considerations that motivate the rest of us. This leads to a critical shift
in emphasis. Rather than concentrating exclusively on how to
control the judge, Fuller insists, we should focus attention as
well on how to provide adequate latitude to allow for sound
judgment, honest explanation, reasonable certainty and uniformity.23 2 This is, moreover, another instance representative
of the way Fuller's jurisprudence serves at once to demystify
our understanding of the law and at the same time to expand
228.

L. FULLER, PracticingLawyer, supra note 79, at 290.

229. Id
230. Id (emphasis added).
231. A contemporary manifestation of this can be found in the preoccupation of Critical Legal Studies scholars with the determinacy and indeterminacy
of judicial decision, see, e.g., Unger, supra note 33, at 657-60; Peller, Book Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1985).
232. See Fuller, Legal Realism, supra note 6, at 434-35.

1986]

FULLER'S JURISPRUDENCE

1141

our sense of possibilities. 233
This explains why the paradigmatic legal figure in Fuller's
jurisprudence is not some mean-minded, rule-bound authoritarian figure 234 but rather the figure of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg. 235 What impressed Fuller so greatly about Jackson's
performance was the deeply creative ethical use to which he
put the traditions of our common law.2 6 Jackson's performance in effect epitomized on a global scale what Fuller saw to
be the central activity of the lawyer: the creative reconstitution
of the inherited materials of our culture toward the end of
helping to realize a more just and decent world. It is in these
several ways that Fuller's jurisprudence, with its central emphasis upon possibilities, serves to infuse our sense of what we
are with a revitalized sense of what-if we were only good
enough-we could be.
In the final analysis the ethical aspiration itself is the crucial thing. Fuller's jurisprudence is like Plato's philosophy in
this respect. In both philosophies, what is most important is
not the final attainment but the pursuit of what is just, good,
and true. Both proceed, indeed, upon the recognition that that
which is pursued or aspired to can probably never be perfectly
achieved, at least not in this world. What matters is not the arrival at some perfectly virtuous end state, but the quality and
character of the ethical struggle itself. That is why, in the end,
Fuller's central effort takes the form that it does: not the attempt to develop a master blueprint for some idealized social
order, but the elaboration of those capacities that are required
by the pursuit of justice and truth. That is why the central emphasis in his jurisprudence is on the development of those capacities of mind and character that are, to recall Fuller's own
237
phrase, "worthy of emulation."
233. For the expression of a similar perspective, this time on the liberating
aspects of institutional constraints, see L. FULLER, Means and Ends, supra
note 24, at 58.
234. Or, even more characteristically in realist jurisprudence, a judicial figure who pretends to be bound by rules when in fact he is using his office to
exercise his own arbitrary will and further his own selfish interests.
235. See L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 718-19.
236. "Justice Jackson had the insight to realize that the process of adjudication can itself be a moral force in men's lives and that this moral force is not

necessarily derived from some other, higher principle, such as established law
or government." Id at 719. For an excellent brief description of Jackson's
performance at Nuremberg, and especially of his powerful opening statement,
see Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 488, 503-04 (1955).

237. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Fuller may have taken his

cue on this point from Aristotle and the central emphasis given in Aristotle's

1142

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1073

VIII. THE COMPLEX ACHIEVEMENT OF FULLER'S
JURISPRUDENCE
Every truly great mind, Coleridge once wrote,
is to be considered in two points of view, the first in that in which he
may be said to exist universally, to act upon all men in all ages; and
that is the grand idea which he first originates, the grand form and
scheme of generalization. And the next is, when quitting the part of
the architect, he himself becomes one of the labourers and one of the
masons. There you will find in him the imperfections, of course, of
every human individual; and while you give him every praise where
he succeeds
you will never permit it to detract from his merits where
2 38
he fails.

In this passage Coleridge suggests an approach that helps illuminate the nature of Fuller's jurisprudential achievement. In
order to understand that achievement, the suggestion is, we
should consider it as an initial matter "in two points of view."
On the one hand, there is "the grand form and scheme" of
Fuller's jurisprudence, represented by the great integrated vision of experience to which his essays collectively give expression.23 9 On the other, there is the detail work-the activity of
mind-reflected in his individual essays. Yet while such a distinction is possible, the moment we begin to apply it we run
into difficulty keeping the two activities-that of the "architect" and that of the "labourer"-separate and distinct. It is as
if the one keeps constantly modulating into the other, then
back again. In a sense this difficulty is a measure of Fuller's
achievement itself. For it is a reflection of the underlying integrity of his jurisprudence that, in the final analysis, Fuller
the "architect" and Fuller the "labourer" are not distinct personalities, but one and the same.
teaching to the development, not of an ultimate ideological vision, but of an
appropriate ethical "attitude." See Aristotle, Book V of the Nichomachean
Ethics of Aristotle, in L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 32, 47.
238. S. COLERIDGE, PHILOsOPHIcAL LECrURES 191-92 (K. Coburn ed. 1949).
239. In giving the emphasis I have to Fuller's effort to develop an ethically
integrated approach to experience, I have not devoted as much attention as I
probably should have to the contributions Fuller makes to our understanding
of the interconnectedness and intricacy of the overall legal process. See supra
note 184. The reason for this neglect is not because I think these process aspects of Fuller's jurisprudence are unimportant. Quite the contrary, I see
them as part and parcel of the larger integrative effort I have been attempting
to describe. Their relative neglect here is simply a consequence of limitations
of space and of the judgment that what is most needed is a view of Fuller's
jurisprudence that will put his process contributions in perspective. My effort,
in short, has not been to provide a complete picture of Fuller's jurisprudence
(which would be impossible to do here) but rather to round out and, to a certain extent, correct the conventional understanding.
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In considering the achievement of Fuller's jurisprudence, it
is helpful to recall the question posed at the beginning of this
essay: What sort of ethical education do Fuller's essays, some
of which were written more than a half-century ago, hold for
us?24 0 I am not sure I can answer that question in any complete or fully satisfactory way here, but let me attempt to suggest at least the form such an answer might take. The starting
point is to recognize that the heart of that education lies not in
some finalized vision of the social order that one might attempt
to extract from his writings,m but in something else. We can
begin to shed light on what that "something else" is by recognizing that Fuller does not simply advocate the embrace of certain values in his essays, he actually performs them. So if we
want to discover the education that his essays potentially offer,
we must regard them not as statements of abstract theory, or as
indifferent containers of thought, but as ethical performances.
What one critic has said about Johnson's essays in this regard applies with remarkable force to Fuller's:
The activities of mind by which these essays move.., comprise a
steady pressure to correct and complicate; a constant openness to new
facts or ideas; a repeated turning from system or theory to experience;
and a hunger for balance, for the capaciousness of mind
that can re24 2
tain at once two opposing tendencies in their full force.

It is difficult to imagine in some respects a more perfect description of the "activities of mind" by which Fuller's own essays "move." In Fuller's effort to develop a jurisprudence
responsive to "a complex and moving reality,"243 we encounter
the same "steady pressure to correct and complicate," the same
"openness to new facts or ideas," the same "repeated turning
from system or theory to experience," the same deep honesty.
Fuller's entire jurisprudence exerts a constant pressure on us
to deal with experience, not in terms of stereotype or pat ideological formula, but fairly and honestly in all its troublesome
complexity. In much the same way, we can see in Fuller's im240. See supra text accompanying note 35 and text following note 35.

241. Fuller explicitly rejected the value of trying to come up with such a
finalized version. His jurisprudence is characterized on this score by a deep
and genuine humility. He certainly was not locked into the existing scheme of
things. In this respect Fuller shared Holmes's belief that "'the world would
be just as well off if it lived under laws that differed from ours in many ways
... .' Fuller, Reason and Fia4 supra note 1, at 389 n.13 (quoting O.W.
HOLMEs, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs
210, 239 (1920)).
242. J. WHITE, supra note 69, at 152.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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aginative employment of the notion of polarity the clear reflection of a Johnsonian "hunger for balance." In a way that
cannot be said of the writings of any other modern jurisprudential figure, Fuller's jurisprudence embodies that special Johnsonian quality: "the capaciousness of mind that can retain at once
two opposing tendencies in their full force."
The education offered by Fuller's essays is like that offered
in a larger sense as well. It lies in the record they
Johnson's
by
provide of the individual human struggle to make sense out of a
complex reality, to see experience in a more complex and integrated light. It is the education that comes from watching
Fuller at work in these essays forging connections between the
opposed terms of the classic antinomes of jurisprudence, between law and morality, fact and value, means and ends, reason
and intuition, justice and efficiency, the legal principle and the
principle of shared commitment, the Western cultural tradition
and the Eastern cultural tradition, carrying us at every point to
greater levels of complexity and integration, and, through a
process of cumulative insight, gradually establishing a truly integrated vision of experience. Fuller's essays exemplify in this
sense the imaginative art of composing out of the inherited material of our culture "a richer bond of union." 2 "
Our education lies as well in what Fuller's essays have to
teach us about integrity, in particular about how difficult it is to
achieve real integrity, both in the way we live our lives and in
the way we give expression to our most deeply-held views. The
great virtue of Fuller's jurisprudence in this respect, and a central source of its educative value, it seems to me, derives from
the fact that it is held together, not by the surface coherence of
245
Its
theory, but by a deeper-a compositional-integrity.
theory
and
dominant patterns are not the patterns of rationalist
logic, but the deeper and more complex patterns of music. In
its grand outline, it is like the classical fugue: a contrapuntal
musical composition that achieves its effect through the continuous interweaving of repeated voices and themes into a single
final statement, a single integrated ethical vision.
The remarkable thing in this respect is the way in which
diversity and unity are combined in Fuller's jurisprudence. On
the one hand, Fuller's essays open upon a world of great and
rich diversity. We encounter here the thick texture of human
244.
245.

192.

See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 190-192 and text following note
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experience in all its complexity. Yet this rich and diverse universe is also a deeply unified one. Somehow it all holds together. In Fuller's world, human activity at every level reflects
the same underlying ethic or impulse. Sometimes it is expressed in terms of a complex relationship of "collaboration
and resistance;" 6 at others, it takes the form of principles that
"fight and reinforce each other at the same time;" 7 at times it
is put in terms of notions that we by necessity oppose but that
in fact imply each other;2 8 and at yet other times, in terms of
those "tensions, contradictions, and competing principles of order" that constitute the life of "an individual or a nation," 9
but, however variously manifested and expressed, the underlying relationship is in the end the same. Our contracts, our
associations, our partnerships, our shared traditions and institutions, even the language we speak, all reflect the same deep underlying pattern, the same fundamental constitution.
Nor is that all: for the same ethic that gives shape and
meaning to the world of external experience in Fuller's jurisprudence informs as well the imaginative design of his essays.
So in the end, there is this connection too-this ultimate
merger of vision and performance. And what unites this great
and various universe, supplying "the thread of connection" that
ties it all together, is what we have called polarity: that capacity, that paradoxical art, of seeing and showing how things "apparently contradictory in fact form indispensable complements
for one another."
Yet, in placing the emphasis that we have on the role of polarity as a unifying force in Fuller's jurisprudence, there are
certain inherent dangers. Perhaps the greatest of these is that
of lapsing into a mechanical fallacy, of coming to assume that
there is an objective something out there called "polarity" and
that all Fuller had to do was sit back and let polarity do the
work. This of course is not the case. But to correct against a
tendency in this direction, it is important to state here what
probably ought to be obvious: that it is not the polarity impulse
itself-not some objective external force operating in independent capacity-that does the integrative work in Fuller's jurisprudence, but Fuller himself and the great creative use to
which he puts the notion.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

197-201.
208-211.
117-125.
219-221.
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It is also important to stress that Fuller's employment of
polarity as an integrative device is only one of a whole range of
integrative activities in which Fuller engages in his essays, and
it is those activities themselves that ultimately form the heart
of our education. Our attention should therefore be not on polarity as an "idea" but on the actual integrative activity in
which Fuller is engaged: making connections between "what
is" and "what ought to be;" 0 developing a mode of philosophical discourse that is not separate and apart from but continuous
with ordinary language;2 1 expanding the perspective backwards and forward through time, so that the "illusory present
instant" can be seen and understood in the context of the expeof those who have come before and of those who will folrience
low;25 2 establishing correspondences which link our lower with
our higher natures, our individual with our collective selves;253
carving out an ethically integrated language capable of recognizing once again "the fact of soul" and "the soul of fact;"
and, in these ways and others, constantly forging anew out of
the inherited materials of our culture and out of repeated enevocative phrase)
counters with experience (to borrow Joyce's
5
"the uncreated conscience of [our] race."
The most impressive part of our experience lies here finally: in the sense one gets when reading Fuller of being in the
presence of a source of great creative self-generating energy. It
is an energy that spills over into our own world. For in the end
it is not the particular connections that Fuller makes that are
most important (although they are not unimportant) but the
impetus his essays create for us to make such connections ourselves. Fuller's essays establish a momentum that carries beyond the particular problems with which he was dealing,
beyond in a sense the printed page itself, into our lives, changing the way that we view experience and the way that we read,
pressing us at every point and at every level to seek out a "full
energies
understanding" of experience, 256 to pursue with all 'our
' 8
7
"the whole truth"25 -to embrace "the whole view."
250. See supra note 218 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying
notes 227-237.
251. See supra text following note 141; supra note 218.
252. Fuller, Williston, supra note 16, at 14-15.
253. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 219-222.
254. See supra note 218.
255. J. JOYCE, A PORTRArr OF THE ARTiST AS A YOUNG MAN 253 (Viking
Press ed. 1916).
256. L. FULLER, PracticingLawyer, supra note 79, at 290 (emphasis added).
257. Fuller, Reason and Fiat, supra note 1, at 390 (emphasis added).

1986]

FULLER'S JURISPRUDENCE

1147

Yet even this, one cannot help but feel, does not reach the
real heart of Fuller's jurisprudence. For the real heart lies at
still another level, in something even more subtle and elusive,
something that might be called attitude or tone. It lies in humanizing aspects of Fuller's jurisprudence that we have barely
been able to touch upon here: in the genuine humility with
which Fuller approaches experience, 2s9 the generosity of
spirit,2 60 the gentle humor,26 1 the civilizing force of his anec-

dotes and metaphors,2 62 and all the other countless ways in

258. Id at 391 (emphasis added).
259. See, e.g., supra note 241.
260. See, e-g., Fuller's characterization of the overreactions on the part of
Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Jefferson to the shortcomings of adjudication as
a mode of social ordering- "Judged in the light of the times, and with the
charity that should be extended to the man who runs purposely to place his
weight on the light side of a tipping boat, these may not have been distortions
at all." L. FULLER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 717.
261. Fuller was capable of being quite funny. See for example his wonderful spoof of Lasswell and McDougal's "system" in L. FULLER, On Legal Education, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L.
FULLER 271, 272-78 (K. Winston ed. 1981).
262. It is illuminating in this respect to compare the metaphorical world of
Fuller's writings with that of the new radical communitarian (or Critical Legal
Studies) literature. Although the latter purports to be a literature of community and peace and love, the central metaphors upon which it proceeds, interestingly, are those of "trashing," disruption, revolution, and war, see, e.g., R.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 118 (1975) (military maneuver and insurgency: "Surrounded on all sides, my tactic, a recourse of despair, is to retreat
the better to advance"); Freeman, Truth and Mystyication in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1230 (1981) ('The goal of trashing... is not liberation
into nihilist resignation... [but] ... to expose possibilities more truly expressing reality .... "); Kelman, Trashing,36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 293 (1984); Boyle,
Book Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1066, 1083 (1985) (describing Unger's book romantically as a "dispatch from the front"). The singlemost remarkable feature
of this new literature of love and peace, indeed, is the extent to which it depends for its very life, at least at the metaphorical level, upon appeal to our
violent natures.
When we compare the metaphorical world of Fuller's writings, what is
most striking is the extent to which these characteristics are not present:
neither the parading around in the metaphorical garb of guerilla warfare, nor
the appeal to our violent natures. The central characteristic of the anecdotes
and metaphors upon which Fuller's jurisprudence proceeds, by contrast, is
their "domestic" quality. Fuller's world is by and large composed of the
materials of ordinary experience: of music and architecture, see supra text accompanying notes 141-145, of school playgrounds, see supra text following note
208; and of scissors, batteries, magnets, and the world of domestic activities, see
supra text accompanying notes 121-124. The appeal Fuller's writings makes to
us, as a consequence, is of a very different sort than that made by the new
literature. While it does not offer the same instantaneous "high," it has a
more subtle civilizing effect. Fuller's jurisprudence offers the terms by which
the world can be put together rather than those by which it might be torn
apart.
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which his jurisprudence forms a constant appeal to our better
selves.
Of course the real heart of Fuller's jurisprudence lies in all
these things: in the great ethically-integrated vision of experience to which his essays collectively give expression; in the integrative thrust of his essays, quite apart from the particular
vision they embody; in the ethically inspired language in which
his essays proceed; in the ethical capacities--capacities of mind
and character-they reflect and perform; in the deep integrity
of Fuller's jurisprudence viewed as a complete performance;
and in the many other, often subtle ways his jurisprudence operates upon us as a civilizing force. These are all finally reflections of the same thing-like light reflected from a many-sided
crystal goblet held up to the sun. They are all reflections, to
borrow the words of another writer in the classic tradition, of
"one single soul complete,/Alive, and sensitive, and self263
aware."

263. D. ALIGHIERI, THE COMEDY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI: PURGATORY, Canto
XXV, lines 74-75, at 265 (D. Sayers trans. Penguin ed. 1955).

